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Introduction
Iron is tha foundation of industrial civilization. It is
tha r*w material for machanical msrvala and the implement, the
uses of which can banish want or destroy humanity. It has
been said that the key to America's wealth lies in her ore
beds. Prom these beds we get steel; from steel the rails that
span the continent, the plows, harvesters and tractors that
help pour nature's abundance into our laps; and the machines
that transform a raw material into a finished good. Tron has
always been prized and for it there is no substitute. Herman
Demarest Lloyd has called it "The Bread of Indus trv".
Its production is the important single industry in a
countrv. Using an invested capital of over four billions of
dollars in the United States , the Industry turns out approxi-
mately that value in products in good business years and
accounts for almost 7# of the total value of industrial pro-
duction in such times. It employs over one-half million wage
earners and has total payments amounting to almost a billion
dollars annually. Tn order to produce 48,000,000 tons of
steel in 1928, the industry had to handle 200,000,000 tons of
raw material - iron ore, coal, coke, limestone etc. One
million men had to work for an annual wage of #1,400,000,000.
and produced a metal worth &3 ,000,000,000. from which goods
were fabricated for which the ultimate consumer paid
*7 ,000,000,000. Steel companies are the biggest coal operators.
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They dominate ship building and operate their own shipping
lines. On the Greet Lakes the Steel Industries have a navy
which combined totals 819 ships of 4,45^,000 tons. They are
the biggest manufacturers of cement, a by-product from slagm
from the furnaces. On this basis, along with the fact that
steel is the most widely used of all metsls , the Steel Industry
warrants the designation of a key industry in highly industrial-
ized countries.
Its tremendous volume of operation and its multiple uses
in other industries have enabled statisticians to eonsJder
Steel as a barometer of general industry. Since the finished
product of the steel mills is virtually the raw material for
all other industries, steel fluctuates in accordance with the
cyclical fluctuations of business. Production records clearly
indicate that cyclical and random forces outweigh any seasonal
tendencies in outout.
Output moves in relatively short cycles - never having
gained for more than three consecutive years and never
declining for more than two. The great imoetus to steel was
the World War, 1914-1918. Due to the depression of 1912, the
industry was slow at first to capitalize on the war demand due
to negligible foreign orders and domestic fear. When the
world realized that the war was to be a long one, foreign
orders poured in and domestic activity awakened. Prom the
middle of 1915 to 1918 the industry soared. Production was
(1) Steel Dictator - Harvey O'Conner N.Y. 1935 p. 28.

on a twenty four hour basis with 100$ of capacity constantly
utilized. Growth and expansion were twins. The depression of
1921 caught the steel industry with a tremendous excess capa-
city and little demand to use it. However, the rise of the
automobile industry in this decade pulled the steel industry
out of the doldrums along with the tremendous business
activity and rise to the high peak of 1929. The decline in
production after 1929 was unprecedented in both duration and
extent with output falling from a daily average of 1£*,PK6
net tons in 1929 to 40,774 net tons in 1932 - the lowest since
1901. As a consequence, the subsequent rise in out-out ^lso
flouted previous standards. Production rose for five consecu-
tive years after 1932 before turning down in 193P.
Yet, Iron mixed with blood is the main ingredient of war.
Steel tanks, shells, shot, shrapnel, armour-plated warships
and bayonets are the stuff of battle. Bismark is reported to
have said that "the great questions of the day are to be
decided not by speakers and majority resolutions but by
blood and iron." Blood and iron in sufficient quantities and
applied with the proper technique is the final answer of
capitalism to its own contradiction. And these problems are
likely to arise from iron. For example, the Lorraine for 70
years has seen blood to determine whether the French or the
German steel magnates are to rule its iron ore deposits .....
the most important in the world next to those of Lake Superior.
Usually iron and steel masters do more than suprl- T war's most

tellinsr arguments in the shape of death utensils and poison
gases which steel passes off as a by-product. They are also
willing to subsidize war scares to help along their business.
They found Security and Navy Leagues to stimulate a steady de-
mand for their wares and hire propogandists to break up inter-
national peace action. Imports of iron and steel, they declare,
are a form of international robbery inflicted on the domestic
working man. Always the steel masters are strident pptriots,
enthusiastic for preparedness and never adverse to a profitable
war.
History has proved that a war was the best customer of the
steel industry. It received its impetus in the Civil ">rar. The
Spanish-American war gave Andrew Carnegie millions with which
to assume his philanthropic work. The World War was the zenith
for steel. Steel had come into its own - a powerful force in
the industrial world. After the war, production techniques
were altered to conform to domestic needs. The post war slump
was minimized by the expanding automobile demand for light
steels. This demand increased steadily through the decade of
the twenties. Since the collapse of twenty-nine, any pertinent
trend of the industry has been overshadowed by the economic and
financial maladies.
The industry today is in its intensive era, deeply rooted
and unwieldly. Its tremendous bulk requires high capacity
operations for efficient and profitable returns. The present
defense program is in a way made to order for the steel

industry, Tt is lifting the industry out of a state of apathy
to renewed activity. Just where it will leave the industry is
a matter for speculation only.
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the effect of
a war economy upon the industry and more specifically upon
production, prices, labor, taxes, earnings, and security
status. The occurances in the last war will he + he basis of
comparison and contrast with the present. In the conclusion,
after surveying the industry from an investment viewpoint,
there shall be an attempt made to evaluate the placing of
steel securities in a portfolio that desires appreciation.
Helen Chester

Chapter T
Economics of Steel
In the younger days of the industry the idea was the
bisrsrer the company, the more economically It could be operated.
This concept J on of the steel Industry was not unwarranted for
steel manufacture entails huge, heavy fixed costs and larere
scale operation. A modern blast furnace requires an Investment
of approximately from four to six million dollars and the
larger furnaces produce as hi^h as 1,100 tons of pig iron In a
day. This example indicates that the steel indus^pv has been
through the years and still is geared to "bigness", and as a
result it has to face all the problems of inflexibility.
Normally in any industry the cost of production varies with
the rate at which capacity is utilized. Operating ratios
fluctuate with the extreme shifts characteristic of demand.
Changes in demand, under competitive conditions, cause a
minimum economic disequilibrium for they engender an adjust-
ment of costs, output, and prices. However, the Inherent in-
flexibility of steel capacity tends to prevent, such an
(1)
adjustment
•
As a result, there are two points of view in considering
a steel plant or an ore m^ne:- (1) as an investment that must
be protected, and (2) as an instrument of production 1-0 be
(1) Report of the Federal Trade Commission on War Time Profits
and Costs of the Steel Industry. Feb. 18. 1928. p. 7.

cherished as loner as it cannot be replaced by a more efficient
instrument. The former is the banker»s point of view; the
latter, the Industrialists, The United States Steel Corpora-
tion is an example of the former. With hundreds of millions
of dollars invested in riant and eqipment since birth, the
interest of the Board of Directors has been the prevention of
deterioration in the investment value of the properties. To
accomplish this, the Board has attempted to freeze the entire
industry at present or past levels without seeming too
agressive in its manner. Judge Gary was the first to do this.
He kept the industry under his control by means of the bigness
of ^he United States Steel Corporation. As earnings increased,
he avoided paying overlarge dividends. Instead, he invested a
large part of earnings back into the plant, which g8ve more
hostages to be protected. The more money spent in the riant
put the Corporation in a defensive position. In other
companies, the industry was managed by steel masters and
followed somewhat the banker policy of the Corporation, content
to take no risks, but to operate with modest but safe object-
ives. They could have competed with the United States Steel
Corporation, but Gary's umbrella over prices gave them a nice
tidy profit. Furthermore, thiswas not the era of the American
pioneering spirit. Lately, this industry has seen independ-
ents, like National, that are breaking out of the ranks, but,
on the whole, the industry is still suffering from a heritage
of three decades of inertia. The Corporation and the industry

have been and still are hammered by a financial rether than an
industrial orientation.
The financial orientation proved that techno! oerical
changes render millions of plant investment worthies s and so
there was little contribution made to the art of making steel.
This explains why the United States Steel Corporation was late
in constructing a continuous strip mill, getting into alloys,
and even yet has not adopted a full combustion control on its
open hearth furnaces. The policy has been "no inventions and
no Innovations". Technologically, the United States Steel
Corporation is one of the most backward of our ma*or
industries. The problems are great, because experimentation
on a large scale is expensive. Germany is the leader here.
We had to learn about stainless steel and how to save millions
by using coke ovens from her. In the last decade, the Corpora
tlon has improved its methods of rolling steel and is using a
continuous strip mill. There is also progress In metallurgy,
especially in the malleability of steel, making possible round
fenders and bendln/r pipes, although very little has been done
about the blast furnace and open hearth design. In an
analysis in 1925 before the American Institute of Mining* and
Metallurgical Engineers, Charles Ramseyer said,
"Actually, the operation of its (Iron and Steel
Industry) basic process has not changed fundamentally
In either theory or fundamental design of equipment
in the past 75 years. Though many other process
industries have been born and developed, and not
seldom completely revolutionized methods during this
period, the primary process of mak^ne* iron and steel
are still carried on along the lines laid down, and

in equipment ori;?niated so lonp* ago by Bessemer,
Siemens, and Martin and subsequently expanded to prac-
tically the modern scale by Carnegie, Schwab, and
Captain Bill Jones in the 1880 »s and 1890*8. (1)
Cost of Production
The United States Steel Corporation in a report to the
Temporary National Economic Committee on February 5, 1940
stated that $182,100,000. is spent on fixed costs regardless
whether the volume of business is 17# or 90$ and the average
costs of each weighted ton of product shipped amounts to
$55,73 per ton. It is easily seen that the cost of producing
steel is great, ^his explains in part why the industry has
been termed "the prince and pauper", - the prince among in-
dustries, but a pauper in its returns to investors due to its
fixed costs. The following chart and table illustrate the
average relationship between Volume and Costs in the operations
of the United States Steel Corporation and subsidiaries as
indicated by the costs of each of the years 192^ to 1958
ad.iusted to 1938 conditions.
Relationship between Total Costs of Operation and
Volume of Business ©— 1938 Conditions.
U.S. Steel Corporation and Subsidiaries. (3)
Year Millions of Weighted Tons Costs - 1938
of products Shipped. Conditions - Millions
of Dollars.
1927 13.0 954.5
1928 14.0 9**. 2
1. Fortune - March, 193f p. 123-4
2. U.S. Steel Corp. T.N.E. C. Papers Vol.TT Chart Studies p53
3. After a chart in United State Steel Corp. T.N.E.G. Papers
Vol. IT p. 52.

Year Millions of Costs - 1938
Weighted Tons Conditions
of Products Shipred. Minions od Dollars.
1929 15.1 979.0
1930 11.9 838.8
1931 8.1 *28.9
1932 4.4 436.0
1933 6.2 512.0
1934 6.1 510.0
1935 7.6 610.3
1936 11.0 818.2
1937 13.2 916.2
1938 7.8 P14.3
Average rela t ionshin : Cost - $182,100,000. plus #55.^3 per
weighted ton of products shipped.
Total Costs are adjusted to 1938 prices.
Weighted tonnages are actual tonnages.
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Variability of Markets
The tfelative importance of consuming lines has changed
considerably. While the railroads and the building industry
were the major outlets in the twenties, today the automobile
industry and the miscellaneous outlets hold first rl^ce. Tn
192*7, railroads along with gas and oil industries tooV 45^ of
the total steel output. In recent vears the rate dropped to
30# because roil road demand has been reduced to a replacement
basis. The Oil and Gas industry failed to hold its position
due to the decelerated growth in refinery constructions and
the sharp reduction in trunk and pipe line construction since
1931. Improved processes in pipe-making permit iing the pro-
duction of lighter, stronger pipe have also contributed.
The construction Industry reached its peak around 1926
and in the following years its demands were sufficient to
maintain its relative importance as an outlet. Since 1931,
however, the amount of steel going into construction has been
limited by the dearth of large commercial, industrial, nnd
utility projects despite government efforts to stimulate
residential construction and heavy outlays for public work.
The drop in the railroad, building, gas and oil industry
has been compensated by the increasing demands of the automo-
bile, the can, and the miscellaneous outlets. According to
the 1939 figures, the automobile industry was steel's best
customer for eight consecutive years tak'ng a total of
5,396,000 net tons or 16.7^ of the total shipment of finished

steel. The last decade has witnessed the hu^e change in the
miscellaneous field. In 1929 this group which includes house-
hold equipment
,
refrigerators, stoves, furniture, hardware,
office equipment, holts, mits , and rivets took a combined
total of 19^ of the total shipment of finished steel whereas
in 1939 it rose to 31.3%. In the last few years this group
even surpassed the automobile demand. The canning industry
(1)
rose from sixth place in 192 r? to third today. For the
duration of the war and of the he^vy National Defense spending,
the bulk of steel production will be for export, shipbuilding,
aviation, capital goods demands and the manufacture of munition
and armaments. With the return of more nor-mal conditions,
outlets more closely related to the consumer are expected to
become the chief support of steel consumption.
Locat ion
Since iron ore is found only in certain regions, it has
been necessary for steel mills to be situated very closely to
the ore. This has removed them from consumptive areas and as
a result has made transportation costs an important factor.
The price policy of the steel companies revolves In p«rt
around this point. In addition, the need of other mater^.rls
necessary to steel production has forced the utilisation of
water borne traffic. For example, coal is brought to the mills
by water and semi-finished and finished goods are carried back.
(1) Moody's Standard Trade and Securities p ST 14-1P.

There is no dansrer of steel mills moving for bull dine new
rolling mills elsewhere means the creation of new plant
capacity when there is idle capacity representing hug-e invest-
ments lying in Pittsburgh and Youngs town.
Prices
The steel industry has enjoyed price fixing for many years
through the mediums of pools, agreements, zoning price systems,
Gary dinners, mutual understandings, sinerle basing point
system (Pittsburgh plus) and the multiple basin? point system.
There exists an interrelation of price fixing with limitations
on new productive capacity. The steel industry desires to
avoid the entrance of new units — low cost units -- if the
price structure is to be maintained. Yet all and any comneti-
tion in the industry centers around prices (price concessions)
and will continue.
Theory
The main idea in the background is how is a com^Rnv to
get the enormous orders necessary to keep mills running at a
profitable rate? The basing point system survives because it
is the best solution as yet. Lower prices are not steel
ideology which is odd when you consider that prices are the
only important factor in steel buying. Since steel manufact-
urers are afraid of cut-throat competition, they have never
agreed that more sales come from reduced prices. They main-
tain that steel itself is a small part of the cost of the

finished article made from it. Therefore, a cut in prices
would stimulate demand very little. Example, steel used in an
automobile costs $31.41 or 4.6# of the total cost. A 25^ cut
in the steel price would result in a 1.15^ cut in automobile
costs. Moreover, since the demand for steel fluctuates with
general business, it is little affected by prices. As a re-
sult, steel men are geared to an industrial philosophy of high
prices and restricted production — prices set at a hifh
enough level to yield a profit when plants are running at 40%
capacity; at r0% capacity profits are sizable, and at H5^ t
(1)
fabulous
•
Price stabilization has been the dominate desire rather
than high prices. A producer must publish his price and if it
is lowered, the new lowered price becomes the base price for
all companies. This policy was carefully laid down by Judge
Gary in the initial days of the United States Steel Corporation
His belief was that if all competitors lowered their prices to
meet the new base, nothing has been gained by the action but
the incentive to reduce prices is removed. Theoretically,
price stabilization fails to stabilize production the funda-
mental aim of the steel producers, for if prices remain anr5
demand keeps increasing there will come a time when production
will have to increase and vice versa if prices remMn and
demand falls off to a large extent, production will fall off
too. Therefore, in order to stabilize production, steel men
ought to try to stabilize demand.
TTT Fortune Apr>il 1 p# \$o - JETT

However, nrices are not as rigid as one might be led to
believe. The public price is only an orening bid pnd bargain-
ing occurs after that. President Girdler of Republic Steel
has proven this point when he moved into Detroit next to the
automobile industry to do away with transportation costs and
began his drastic policy of price concessions. Criticisms of
the present price policy have labeled it as artificial, waste-
ful, discriminatory, and uncompetitive. The steel industry is
one in which there is limited competition because producers
and consumers are centralized. Eighty-five percent of the
steel produced goes to 1200 customers. Steel buyers are
divided into two groups, one the small aristocracy big and
strong enough to force competition, and the other the vast
proletariat of little fellows who have to taVe it. In 1934
100 customers bought 42% of total tonnage sMpped
3 " " 91% of auto steel
5 n " 90% of tin plate
10 " M 90% of railroad steel
2 n " 20% of structural steel. (1)
One united phalanx faces another.
Basing rolnt System
The Pittsburgh Plus was the name fiven to the price
system established by Gary. He decided the price of steel to a
consumer would be that of the finished product price plus all
freight transportation costs from Pittsburgh regardless where
made. The rise of Chicago as a steel center with Pittsburgh
as the basing point made the system unpopular. Tn 19^4, the
Til Fortune April 19?6 p. 127.
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Federal Trade Commission ordered Its abolition. The United
States Steel Corporation agreed to comply, but retained the
fundamental theory by increasing the number of basing points*
There were three in 1923, nineteen in 1924 and by 1927 there
were twenty-nine* The N.R.A. and the steel Code in 1933 in-
creased the number to forty five and by March, 1940 there were
eighty, "However, there usually remained a differential at
other basing points over quotations at Pittsburgh on the same
(1)
price, " On June 24, 1938 the United States Steel Corporation
announced sharp reductions in many products for the third
quarter, but also set identical prices at various basing points
eliminating the differential which previously existed, "The
general elimination of differentials between the major basing
points has in effect, disrupted the fundamentals of the system
and encouraged the development of widespread competition such
as that witnessed during June and October 1938, May 1939, and
(2)
April 1940."
Under the Pittsburgh Plus, the Corporation becomes a
policeman having 65% of total ingot steel capacity. All it
does is set the price and sees it automatically followed. The
Pittsburgh Plus is a classic example of an artificial price
structure. The principle is simple. When the base price for
steel is $40.00 a ton in Pittsburgh and the transportation
costs to the consumer's door are $7.60, the price of steel is
(1) Poors, Steel and Iron Industry Survey p.S2-13
(2) Ibid., p. S2-14.
-
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$4'7 .60. If steel is produced in your city end you wish to
purchase it at the neighboring will, you still pay the base
price for steel in Pittsburgh plus transportation costs if it
were sent to you from Pittsburgh even though you walked into
the neighboring mill and procured the steel yourself. It is
obvious that the huge United States Steel Corporation maintained
these rigid prices in order to remain in competition with the
more conveniently located companies.
The Temporary National Economic Committee conducted a
monopoly investigation on the steel industry in lete 1939 and
early 1940. The government took the stand that price reductions
in steel during periods of bad business would stimulate the
nat1on f s entire economic machinery without adversely affecting
the income of steel producers. The steel manufacturers
answered this charge by saying that the inelpstic nature of the
steel demand and the production costs led them to the conclu-
sion that price reductions would not increase industrial
activity sufficiently to offset the expenses involved in
lowering the already small profit margin. Something can be
said for both sides. The Temporary National Economic Committee
is delving in theory and the law of supply and demand while the
steel industry is presenting statistical facts and findings.
On the other hand, many who know the industry state that profit
(1)
margins are too low, which also explains the reluctance to
lower prices.
(1) poor's Steel and Iron Industry Survey 1940 p.S2-14-15

Management
The pertinent problems of Management in the last decade
have been financial, operation, sales, organization, and
personnel. Each company has been and still is faced with these
problems - some like the United States Steel Corporation to a
greater extent than others. Financial problems have in the
main revolved around rehabilitation of riant and eauipment,
taxes, indebtedness, and capital structure. TTie companies
which have installed continuous roll in;* m1Hs found their return
very handsome from the light steel market. National Steel was
the first to do this back in 1927. As a result, she alone
stood out in the depression and produced an amazing sales
volume and earnings record from 1932-19.35.
United States Steel on the other hand was a sad story.
Heavy indebtedness, interest charges, rising taxes, and labor
costs were too powerful to present a favorable record during the
depression years. Myron Taylor set out to correct these
problems and made out fairly well. He retired many subsidary
bonds, cut interest charges, Improved plant and property, went
after and got a good share of the automobile trade, organized
the sales policies, whipned the Corporation into one harmonious
whole instead of several separate entities and nut new blood in
the personnel.
Its problems are not all solved. The tremendous riant in-
vestment and size represents a deteriorating bulk. Replacement
is not desired for excess capacity has been a problem for many

years. Deterioration of plant is shunned because of the large
initial investment. Tn short, there is need for a chance in the
United States Steel Corporation or else it will become « corpse
embalmed in a stroner financial position. However, any forth-
coming change Will be slow due to its size and unwieldly bulk.
Other Steel3
Light Steel :
Since 1926 a total of 26 continuous sheet and strip mills
have been placed in operation with an approximate capacity of
16,929,000. net tons. Although but few more mills of a wide
variety are expected to be built in the next few years, it is
lively that additional continuous rolling mills will be con-
structed. Contr ibut ing to the demand is the rapid chon^e from
hot rolled tin plate to a cold rolled product. The trend of
both hot and cold mills is for increased speed and, therefore,
for larger capacities. This emphasis on finishing mill con-
struction has resulted from the demand for a great diversifica-
tion of finished products and heavier orders from the auto and
tin plate manufacturers. The new continuous mills are fast
rendering obsolete not only the old manually operated, but even
the original continuous mill. Companies having the new
facilities or the resources and the courage to build them are
better situated to take advantage of ^he new preferences for
lieht and corrosion-resisting steel and steel alloys. Expanding
light steel capacity is subject to Increased competition and is
reflected in instances of price cutting, mainly due to the
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strong "bargaining power of the automobile industry which is the
largest consumer of steel sheets and strips. With new marVets
expanding rapidly, prospects over the longer term are for
satisfactory price levels.
Inasmuch as modern armaments frequently are made from
specifications requiring electric furnace steel, there is a
sizeable expansion in 1941 for thistype of plant facility. The
expansion under way should Increase annual capacity by 500,000
net tons. Expansion in the consumption of light steel has
steadily been in evidence during recent years. It is estimated
that 45% of the total finished steel products for sale by the
industry in 1939 consisted of light steel Including steel sheets
and strips, tin plate and wire products. In 193^ pnd ]Q?7 t
light steel was equal to 43$ of total finished steel products
and in 1938, 46.3$. This low rate of increase over the year is
attributed to a sharp decline on the parts of the building,
automobile, and railroad industries. The present reviving
demand from the automobile Industry, the further cyclical
expansion of construction activity, and the potential higher
demand from the railroads point to the maintenance of a heavy
steel consumption ratio at levels close to or slightly above
the 1937-1938 figures. It is true that heavy steel is renuired
for the defense program and for two naval fleets, but after that
what? The demand will shift to light steel. Already it has
gained a position of leadership over the heavy steels due for
the most part to a reduced relative importance of the heavy
•
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steel users (the building and the railroad industry and the
rise of the automobile, container, and the miscellaneous
industries). That there has been a definite shift in demand
has been evidenced in recent years. The current trend is to-
ward an increased use of steel in the construction of residences
and garages, filling stations, shops, smell buildings, furni-
ture, stc. - all promising light steel outlets. Moreover, we
see the tendency towards light wAlght railroad equipment both
for passenger and freight service. The conclusion is that the
growth of light steel is not a temporary phenomenon, but a
permanent transition and its peak is nowhere in sight as yet.
Aside from defense orders there is little evidence of nnv
underlying growth in the consumption trend of heavy steel. It
is more HVely that production of heavy steels In years to
come will still be characterized chiefly by wide v*r1 p tions
rather than by any strong uptrend.
Alloys :
Alloy steels did not assume any commercial importance until
the time of the World War. Since then research sought to de-
velop steels with such desirable properties as greater unit
strength with conseauent weight reduction, superior resistance
to heat, abrasion, corrosion, and fatigue etc. The tendency is
distinctly in Veeping with the trend toward greater special iza©
tion in the demand for steels. Because of its rotent i al 1 t ies
,
al 1 steals are devoting considerable attention to them. Frrall
as yet, alloy steel is a minor part of the business. Some
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smaller units have devoted all their attention to them.
(Vandiann Alloys, Firth Sterling, Jessup, Universal Cyclops and
Rustless Iron). In the larger comranies, only Alleghany-Tudlum
,
Crucihle, and Republic Steel are seriously Interested. The
rapid growth of alloy steel demand from less than 1% of total
steel output in 28 years is not to he overlooked. Alloy steel
production alone jumped 56# in 1936. The most important con-
sumers of alloy steel are the automobiles, machine tools, and
the railroads. Since these industries are vulnerable to
business conditions, so is alloy steel.
The war demand for alloys should be heavy in view of the
broader use of such metals. Examples. Bullets are now made of
steel and nickel. Airplanes consume many types of alloy steels,
while mechanized war equipment will require lighter steel for
some purposes end durable alloy steels for others. For the
duration of the National Defense Program machine tools, ship-
building, aircraft, ^nd armaments will rise in relative import-
ance as alloy steel users and the automohil e , industry f s
tradltonal leadership will be threatened, but only temporarily
and eventually it will be re-established. Undoubtedly, the war
will promote a trend toward diversification of outlets.
Since the alloy industry is still in its infancy, it will
have to get consumer acceptance before it makes any headway.
Prices differ as widely as the formulas and vary from $55.-
$700. a tone for the more common types. Price reduction must
await improvements in methods of manufacturing. Although the
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higher costs of raw materials and the heavier unit cos^s of
power, l?bor, «nd overhead indicate th^t alloy steels will
command a much higher price than most carbon varieties, alloy
steel promises to be a matter of small lot production. The
process of cost reduction will take time and will be a barrier
to a sudden change in the relative importance of alloys under
normal conditions. On the other hand, the importance of these
materials in the defense program indicates a relative increase
for their use in the future.
Estimated Distribution of Alloy Steel (1)
(unit %)
Auto Machine Oil Asricul. Const. R.R.
Tool
1939 54.7 7.3 1.1 1.7 1.7 3.2
1938 54.0 6.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 5.4
1937 59.7 6.8 0.9 1.9 0.7 1.7
1936 59.8 6.6 1.1 3.0 0.5 1.0
1935 72*2 4.5 1.8 2.9 0.9 0.6
1934 53.3 4.9 1.5 2.4 1.5 0.6
1933 68.3 3.6 2.0 2.1 0.7 0.3
isxport Shipb. Miscell.
1939 3.9 3.6 22.8
1938 2.4 1.4 2t.6
1937 7.0 0.4 20.9
1936 7.0 0.4 20.6
1935 2.3 0.4 14.4
1934 4.1 1.2 30.5
1933 0.9 0.5 21.6
Plastic Threat:
There has been increased rumor that plastics will replace
iron and steel especially in the automobile and construction
industry. Many surface parts of automobiles are made of plastic
wood, but there are also many inherent ciifficuties that hamper
(1 ) Stanlard Statistics: Standard Trade and Securities, Steel
and Iron. Basic Survey parti, Oct. 4,1940. Vol.98 No. 2 Sec 2.1?J/-/7
nR.2S
r
»0
complete usurpation by plastics. It is true that they are in
direct competition with die casting alloys. Their advantages
are lightness of weight, smoothness of surface, and no external
finish. Nevertheless, metals are still better conductors of
heat, are also electrical conductors (plastics are not), and
are usually cheaper per pound. Die castings are stronger than
moulded plastics, because they have greater heat resistance
qualities and are malleable. Furthermore, they can be used in
complex designs, permit greater variations in section tMckness,
yield higher dimensional accuracy, and usually pern^t higher
production ratio.
Plastics will not replace sheet metal completely in the
automobile industry, because obviously, if another metal would
save weight, reduce production costs without hampering the
quality or the performance, sheet metal would be discarded.
However, before they can be accepted, plastics must have a
tensile strength of 40,000 pounds per inch (estimated) and the
modulus of elasticity must increase from 12 to 15 M. In
addition, plastics must be able to withstand the effects of low
and high temperatures much better than the present ones do, as
well as become fireproof, shatter proof, and more amendable to
repair. Much remains to be done in the field and the alert
steel industry will make adequate provisions to meet this
competition.



Chapter II
World War No. I.
When the lost World War broke, the United States was in
the midst of a depression. The peak of business rrosrerlfy was
reached in the foil of 1912. A chancre in leadership in
Washington and the question of the tariff were contributing
causes to the downswing. Congress legislated to o^en our
markets to sharp foreign competition by the Underwood Tariff
which became effective in October, 1913. The Mexican disturb-
ance became an element of fear that our occupation of Vera Cruz
would lead us into war. The European war dislocated commerce
and finance throughout the world and caught the United Stages
at a time when the new tariff involved us heavily in debt to
foreign countries. The sudden demand for gold, not only to
meet our indebtedness, but to take up a considerable bulk of
our securities thrown on our markets by foreign holders, brought
about a stringency of credit and currency which almost para-
lysed business. This condition was relieved somewhat by the
issuance of emergency currency on the pprt of the United States
Treasury.
The favorable developments at the time were overshadowed.
Farmers had good cotton and wheat crons in 1914, but suffered
from conservative buying. The opening of the Panama Canal in
August, 1915 was clouded by the European war. The outbreak of
war abroad led to the belief of big orders here. We received
a few at first, but not the reflex anticipated.

Position of Steel
Prior to the war, Germany and England were the world's
great producers of steel with Germany assuming leadership.
With these notions embroiled in warfare, America stood alone as
a producer to supply all wants. In 1912, our capacity stood at
2,900,000 net tons, 3,000,000 in 1913, and bv 1914 our capacity
had increased to 3,300,000 net tons of steel. We were in a
position to well take care of increased orders even with this
capacity, for actual production of steel in 1914 fell from
(1)
2,500,000 net tons to 1,700,000 net tons. Tt must be remember
ed that 1914 was a very distressing year for steel. Almost
every manufacturer had to draw on surpluses accumulated in
better days to meet current expenses. Manufacturers became so
alarmed over the conditions of the trade that the American Pig
Iron Association instituted an inquiry into the relative costs
of production prices at which members were selling. The in-
quiry found that the average loss in February of ^hat yeaf was
95^ per ton.
As foreign demands increased, steel production picked ur.
At first, sales were not heavy and the United Stages Steel
(2)
Corporation was making most of them. In 1913 the country had
183 open hearth steel plants of which 158 of them were 8ct1ve
and 25 idle. Producing csrpaclty was located in four districts.
1- Pittsburgh and the surrounding communities where
(1) Steel Pacts, February 1941 No. 45 p. 4-5
(2) Iron Age, September 10,1914 p.624-5.

the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia
converge.
2- Youn^stown- Cleveland ar^a some one hundred miles
north of the Pittsburgh district.
3- Chicago and environs
4- the region around Harrisburg, Bethlehem, and Baltimore.
Plant capacity was rapidly increased during the war year.
Each year saw tremendous increases. For example,
1914 - 3,300,000 net ton capacity
1915 - 3,400,000
1916 - 3,800,000
191^ - 4,150,000
1918 - 4,375,000 (1)
Actual steel ln tTot production during the war rose from 25
million to 48 million tons with capacity operation risinp from
59% to 94t - the high Point cached in 1918. Example.
(2) (3)
Production Capacity Operation
(million tons) (%)
1914 25.5 59.2
1915 35.0 7^.0
1916 46.3 94.3
1917 48.8 90.8
1918 48.2 84.6
Of this total production, foreign demands took
(4)
Total prod. Exports $>
(millions of tons) (000»s of tons)
1914 25.5 129.123 5.19$
1915 35.0 293.207 8.4$
1916 46.3 503.971 10. 8%
1917 48.8 536.980 21.03
1918 48.2 444.835 9.4#
7l ) Steel Pacts, February 1941 p. 4-5
(2) Survey of Current Business May 30, 1940 p. 17
(3) Moody's Standard Trade and Securities Report 1940 P. ST 13
(4) United States Department of Commerce - Survey of Current
Business as of January 1, 1922 No. 6 p. 42 - 43.
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By August 1914 the United ^tates Steel Production kept r rate
of operptlon equal to 1,995,261 tons or ^4,3^3 tons a day.
This was a net increase of 1200 tons ovf-r the rrecedlnc month.
Bethlehem's production for the same month was lust below one
million tons; Jones Tauchlln's p m'll^or. and a hnlf; and
Reruhl'c Steel lust over a mill* on. As t»->e war went on, more
capacity was built andrroduc.t ion was increased. Plan"" cansoity
rose from 450, 000 in 1915, to 3,800, 000 in 191* to 4,l°O f 0O0
in 191^ to 4,400,000 in 1918.
The yepr 1915 was marked by feverish ftaate. Ry September
and October steel m^lls were op^ratinp" at a fast n^ce. The pirn
was to p^ss the t v^ree million ton mark in rip; iron and steel
ingots. Production, shipments, nnd prices were rising.
Domestic demand was improving, particularly the railroads. The
tendency on the port of nil producers was to oversell. Forelcn
trpde exronled as well as our credit pbrnad. ^he United States
h«d p l^rceer fnvor-pble balance of trade everv month. The low
rpte of exchange cpused ^old to flow this way pnd the steady
decline in iron and steel nrlces throughout 191* was hplted nnd
began to rise. At the outset of *-he yepr plnnt oorrrMons were
bet-een 40^ to 50 K> of cppadty. On Febru^r 11, 1915 opera-
tions increased to ^Ot and by June, s^e^l wps b% P0# of capa-
city
.
Although t^e steel prosneritv In 1915 wps mainly caused by
the war, it must be subdivided, ^he United States was re-
ceiving a larger merchandise tr-de balance. The country was

more prosperous and domestic customers were buying more freely.
The war was giving us increased trades with the neutrals. We
launched into a program of increased commodity exchange and
trade relations with Latin America. Belligerents were buying
foodstuffs, clothing, etc., here which caused expansion in their
manufacture and a demand for steel in erecting new capacity.
The foreign demand for ammunition increased the demand on steel
mills and similarly the foreign demand for steel Vrpt Industry
at top speed.
Since the United States Steel Corporation was not in the
munitions business on a large scale, it got off to a slow start.
The first foreign orders were for the trench barbed wire, and
later for shrapnel, bars, explosive shells, guns and auto
trucks. Russia was in need of locomotive and steel cars and
rails. By the middle of 1915, United States Steel was operating
at 90% of capacity and exporting l/3 of her total production.
Up to April 1, 1917, United States Steel supplied 000, 000
tons for munitions.
In 1914 Schwab bought the Fore River shipbuil rilnt? nl nnt
and stood readv to furnish complete battleships at the outset
of the war. Earlv in 1914, she took orders for several big
guns for Germany and later for the Allies. As soon as Great
Britain declared war on Germany, Lord Kechtner called Schwab
and signed a contract for Bethlehem* s full munitions supply*
In two years Bethlehem became the world 's fciggest munitions
producer and its shipbuilding plants turned out more tonnage
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than all of Germany's yards. Because It was ruled illegal to
build submarines, Bethlehem made parts and shipped them to
(1)
Canada for assembly, Schwab also bought the Pennsv"! vania
Steel Company in 1916 with mills in Lebanon and Steelton
(Harrisburg) and subsidized the Maryland Steel Company at
Sparrow's Point near Baltimore. The Pennsylvania Steel Company
doubled Bethlehem's capitalization and transformed it from a
munitions and a shipbuilding firm into a general steel organi-
zation matching the United States Steel Corporation at nearly
all points of manufacture.
Prices
Due to the increased demand prices rose. At first, there
was a great degree of speculation in pig iron prices. Specula-
tors hunted for orders and in March, 1914 booked heavy unfilled
orders for the latter part of the year, buying steal pt $11.50
a ton in Buffalo, New York and $9.23 a ton in Birmingham,
Alabama to be sold at #13.00 and $14.00 later. They also bought
large blocks to hold for the rise in prices. By October, 1914
the huge excess of demand over supply stimulated the offering
of premiums over the regular prices. This situation became
aggravated in November and December. An increase of 25^ a ton
in pig iron used to be considered an event, but when prices in-
creased 75^ and $1.00 a ton, everybody saw that the war spiral
of prices was goin°- into operation. England at first refused
(1) Steel Dictator p. 77-78

to buy steel at American prices because they were too hich. In
1914 she said, "Seml-f inished steel is firm, bu+- American
(1)
makers are asking too much for lt. M
The year 1914 was one of low prices for all steels. In
December of that year the market price of pi? Iron was $12.39
a gross ton; $30. 7 a fross ton for finished steel : and ($9.13
for steel scran. In the following years, the demand taxed the
existing capacity and prices rose. The speculative spi*a] was
at its height in July 1917 when nrices wer»e
pig iron
finished steel
scrap
per gross ton. % gain over 1914
152.11 300<£
119.50 22Q%
37.21 310#
(June, 1917)
Steel was experiencing a run away market. Prices advanced
sharply and differed from day to day. Never before in the
history of the country had steel en.loyed such a heavy demand.
Steel was in its hey-day. Pig Iron prices in 1915 will
illustrate the rapid increases experienced.
prices 1915 (£)
July 28
Aug. 18
Aug. 25
Sept. 8
Nov. 17
Dec. 1
&14.50 per ton
15.00
15.50
16.00
17.25
18.25
Jan. 2,1916 20.00
frice Control
In April, 1917 when the United States entered the war,
price controls were placed on 537 commodities - among these
(1) Iron Age Sept. 10, 1914 p. 239 col. 2.
(2) Iron Age Sept. 2, 1915 p. 538 col. 1 + 2/

being steel. Bernard Baruck and J, Leonard Raplogle bargained
with the industry. Judge Gary was chosen as spokesmen for
steel. He submitted prices based on sharply increased costs
of raw materials and labor for consideration. In answering all
protests to such a larpre increase in prices, Gary states that
all steel comranies must operate to supply the destan'd and that
high cost producers required hlcrh prices to make a profit. He
convinced the War Industries Board that a stabilized pi-ice
should be a stimulating one to attract maximum production.
The prices stabilized by the government were hi^h enough to
assure profits to the least economical producers and banner
profits to the intergrated companies. In October-, 191^ prices
fell - pig iron from $52.11 per gross ton to $33.21; finished
steel from $119.50 to $7*7.70; and steel scrap from $37.21 to
(1)
$20.00 per gross ton. These prices were favorable to the
industry for they were hiph enouerh to assure each producer a
hands om<~ return.
Labor
Labor is a vital factor to the steel Industry. Furnaces
may be able to melt, mould, and shape steel, but men are re-
quired to operate the furnaces. The Steel Industry is the
largest employer of all basic industries, conseauently it has
a great deal of power and responsibility for the way of life,
security, and hspriness of millions of Americans. The Labor
(1) roor's. Steel and Iron Survey 1940 p.S2 - 8.
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policy of the industry as a whole has been one of shunning
organized labor. The men are paid by the hour and h^ve become
accustomed to accepting a long twelve hour working day. The
United States Steel Corporation has set the wage patterns for
the entire industry. Its policy has been inflexible with no
exceptions for any mills. The wages paid were less than those
set by the union scale based on the statement that employees
held steadier employment which compensated for the low wage
rate, but equalized the annual waeres with those of other
industries. Adhere inn- strictly to an open shoo, the Corpora-
tion has been termed a ,fTJnlon wrecker".
Since the turn of the century, the labor movemrnt has
changed, steel towns changed, national and racial grnurs be-
come diffused and the steel workers themselves c^ane-ed, but
(1)
the Corporation Labor Policy did not change.
Criticisms of the Corporation^ l«bor policy have revolved
around the following parts.
1- depressinc waces and lengthening hours
2- spying on workmen
3- debauching unions
4- corrupting" union leaders
5- adherincr to an open shoo policy thereby menacing the
establishment of labor organizations.
6- suppressing any measure of democracy, denvinr free
(?)
speech, and the ri^ht of assembly to workers.
(1) This is stated as the course of event s~ before ^he N.R.A. code
(2) Fortune May 1936 p. 134.

10.
1
i
However, wages const itue approximately 1/3 of fixed costs In
the industry. Of the items which vary with reverses in volume,
pay rolls, goods and services purchased represent over 90% of
(1)
the additional costs per ton. In the last war, as production
soared to high capacity operations, labor was working at least
12 hours a day and more often 16 and 20 hours. Time and a half
for overtime was not instituted until October 1, 1918. Wage
rates differ in eacb industry according to the tyre of work and
the location of the industry. The onlv statistical figures
available refering to wages in the last war period are a series
of percentage increases and when they went into effect. Tn
1916 all wages were advanced 10^. Additional measures were as
follows
:
% Increase (2)
Feb. 1, 1916 10
May 1,1916 1,3.6 yearly incr. 43. 6$
Dec. 15,1916 10
May 1, 191^ 9
Oct. 1, 1917 10 yearly incr. 19.%
April 1«, 1918 15
Aucr. 1,1918 10.5 yearly incr. 35. 5#
Oct. 1, 1918 10
(based on a ten hour day. At this time basic day
changed to 8 hours and time and a ho If for over-
t ime
.
)
Although these figures seem large, we must bear In m^nd that
the costs of living had increased tremendously In this period
which would alter the picture presented by these figures.
Stpikes
Several times labor has attempted to enforce its demands
(1) U.S. Steel Corn. T N E C papers Vol. IT p. 55
(2) Daugherety, Carrol. Vol. I p. 321.
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via a strike and each time It has failed. The Industry was too
powerful and could not be forced from without. The tremendous
activity during the war period had led certain labor leaders,
one William Z. Foster in particular, to attempt to force the
Steel Industry to recognize labor organizations. Approximately
500,000 ment went out on a strike at. the Homestead riant of the
United States Steel Corporation in 1919. It was a serious up-
rising since all sections of the company voiced an opinion as
to the desirability of a strike in a basic industrv, the
worker's plea was primarily still recognition of a strong
industrial union and the abolition of the 12 hour dav . To
labor the strike was ''a spontaneous revolt acainst intolerable
conditions n Judge Gary refused to negotiate and employed
armed guards from Pinkerton's Detective Agency to break the
strike. The strike lasted for three months during which the
workers were attacked by historians, the press, churches, and
the Interchurch Movement. The strike collapsed when the
American Federation of Labor turned against the instigators
(1)
of the strike, William Z. Foster. The twelve hour day was
abolished in 1934 by Judge Gary.
Taxes
Aside from the usual corporate and income tax, the steel
industry was not affected by taxes in the last war until 1918
when the excess Profits Tax went into effect. Taxation was no
worry for steel producers. They were able and did reap big
(1) Fortune May 1936 p. 160 col. 1+2

gains from the war abroad. When the Excess Profits Tax went
into effect, it established a legal tax base of from 20^ to P0<£
of earnings above 9% invested capital plus a munitions tax of
12^% - later reduced to 10<£. The United States Steel Corpora-
tion's taxes were
1916 $27,000,000.
1917 252,000,000.
1918 298,000,000. (amounted to 1 50<£ of net
earnings
.
)
As a rule it can be said that taxes for the industry in 191P
(1)
varied between 100^ and 150^ of net earnings.
Investor's Status
Any investor to whom the safety of principle Is the first
objective coupled with some appreciation must take into eonsld-
eratlon the type of industry, its good as well as Its bad
points, and the relation of the industry to the existing
conditions. The Steel industry in the last war grew to tre-
mendous heights and en.loyed rich earnings. This we know
happened due to the big war demand for steel. Prices sky-
rocketed and wasres increased, but nowhere near to the same
degree as profits. To review the war period from the investor'
viewpoint, one must go back to 1914. This year was not prosper
ous to the Industry because business was in a slump. One
company after another had to forego the pavment of dividends
for the year. No improvements or replacements could be made
because of a lack of funds. The general industrial scene was
(1) Poors Steel and Iron Survey p. S2 - 8.

a drab-colored record of lapses deferred by a lack of business.
In the beginning of 1914, stocks were low. Prices were low and
mill orders were fair, and on the point of diminishing. The
United States Steel Corporation barely earned the preferred
dividend in the first quarter of the year and after paying the
common stock dividend from surplus, the deficit for the year
was $6, 289, 444.
Investment Status
The investment status prior to our entry into t^e war was
as follows: United States Steel bond obligations Fere regarded
as a high investment basis. The record of the company from
1901-1914 was successful even in the years of depression In the
steel Industry. The margin of safety above all interest,
sinkinc fund, and depreciation requirements was very heavy.
Preferred stocks in 1914 were regprded as a secure Industrial
investment, for during the ten year period 1904-1914 heavy
amounts of earnings in general depreciation of property and in
replacements were set aside creating a heavy amount of equity
in back of the large preferred issue. At that time it was
estimated that even under worse trade conditions the corporation
would have no difficulty in reporting a surplus of manr millions
above its preferred dividend requirements. Common stock of the
United States Steel Corporation hod established itself even at
th^t time as responsive to the fluctuating profits of the
corporation -- and while no substantial dividend from 1901-1914
had been paid, it was regarded as a speculation rather than as

(1)
an Investment*
Bethlehem, on the other hand, from 1901-1914, made steady
rrogress in strengthens ng its financial "position as well as
expanding its business. The surplus abover all fixed charge
requirements increased rapidly since 1908. A great bulk of the
surplus each year had been appropriated for denreciat 1 on and
improvements, thus Improving the position of the bond issues.
The several issues of bonds were given a fair raUnr by Moody's.
Dividends on the preferred issues had begun in 1909 and ""ere
not considered as a seasoned investment although it seemed
likely that normal disbursements could be maintained under the
then present normal trading conditions. While other companies
suffered from the depression, Bethlehem earned &9, 600,000 in
1914.
In contrast to the two large heavy steel oroduce-ns,
Republic Steel in 1914 outshone the industry leaders. In the
preceding years, the com-nany showed marked fluctuations in its
earning power, but since 191? it recovered from its extreme
reaction. Earninp-s in 1914 indicated that for fhe present time
the preferred issue was secure. Since the bonds did no^ consume
a heavy portion of the surplus, they were regarded as a substan-
tial investment. The most interesting item in the comparison
of the three companies is the margin of safety.
(1) Moody's Analysis of Investment 1914 p. 946
(2) Ibid, p. 6*6
(3) Ibid, p. 7^0, 916 r. 465.

United States Steel
1914
32<&
Bethlehem ^2%
Republic 55%
When the size of the three companies is considered, it is olain
to see that Republic did better than the leaders and in the
year 1914, Republic was by far the better speculation since in
that year no absolute investment in steel was considered sound.
However, before and with our entry into war, the United
States Steel Corporation dominated the industry mainly because
of its size pnd leading position. Tn 1914 it received 70$ of
all war orders, but It must be remembered that war orders in
this year were sm«ll and mainly consisted of barbed wire, shells
and shot, tin, and plate steel. As the war continued and the
steel industry expanded to take care of the increased demand,
earnings became s tag^eriner . For example,
Earning exceeded all expectations in 1916 and became the
year to own steel securities. All deferred dividends on
cumulative dividend stocks were wiped out and eve^v company
declared extra distribution of profits. Tn 191^, earnings were
four times those of 1914 due primarily to doubled capacity
operations and a B9% increase in tonnage shipped. Gross
(1 ) Poors Steel and Iron Survey p. S2-8.
united States Steel (1)
net earned Profits per ton
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
71,663,615 $7.05
130,396,012 9.97
333,574,178 19.16
295,292,188 17.15
199,350,680 12.60
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business for the Corporation alone was over a billion dollars a
year and in the final quarter of 1916 earnings were $106,000,00C
As a result, extra dividends come fast. Basedon 1914 profits
the United States Steel Corporation made an excess war profit
of |66l,000,000 for the years 1915-19l8~a net of $533 for
every German killed. The war was very profitable to the steel
industry. By the end of the war assets increased by
$771,000,000, and there was no more watered stock (1). In the
two-year period 1916-1918 dividends alone amounted to
$282,000,000 on 400,000,000 shares of preferred and common
stock. Holders of $508,000,000 in common stock received
$207,000,000— an income of 40^ on stock. Bethlehem, on the
other hand, earner) $61,000,000 in 1916, nearly as much as that
earned in the ten- year period from 1905-1915. In the next two
years earnings rose to $54,000,000 in 1917 and $57,000,000 in
1918. (2)
Following is a statistical table illustrating earnings and
the price range of Common stock. (3)
Earnings
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
U. S. Steel 71,663 130,396 333,574 295,292 199,350
Bethlehem 9,378 23,787 60,092 51,002 54,417
Republic 2,407 5,622 16,893 28,769 18,906
Inland 1,637 4,4l4 11,241 21,240 14,473
1. Watered Stock of U. 3. Steel Corporation explained in
Appendix.
2. Steel Dictator, p. 85.
3. All figures from Moody's 1920 United States Steel.
dp. 916-920. Bethlehem, pp. 465-471. Reoublic. pp. 867-868.
Inland, pp. 299-330.
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Earnings on Stock (dollars)
United States St.
1. Preferred
2. Common
Bethlehem Steel
1. 8% preferred *
2. 7% preferred
3 . C ommon
Republic Steel
1. Preferred
2. Common
Inland
1. Common
1914 1915 1916
i6.52 21.05 75.37
9.96 48.46
1917
62.24
39.15
92.20
37.50 119.90 292.40 168.60
32.60 113.10 286.30 40.50
4.00 14.00 59.16
37.84
63.43
51.89
1918
38.17
22.09
53.10
90.80
21.00
31.17
22.22
42.00 21.0014.00 38.00 105.00
^referred issues in 1917.
It can be said that the war period 1914-1915 was profitable
to the steel industry and therefore to the investor. Dividend
disbursements were liberal. For example:
1. United States Steel Corporation
Dec. 30, 1914 Declared dividend was i of 1%
Dec. 30, 1915
1916
1917
1918
1913
5% regular
5%
5%
5%
3 3/4$ extra
12%
9%
1%
2. Eethlehem
January 2, 1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
Declared dividend
ii
ii
ii
ti
H
%
9%
30%
19%
regular and 5% extra
(1)
1. Moody's 1920 p. 916-920 and p. 468-469.



Chapter III
Intervening Period
Most wars are followed by a sort of feverish activity and
expansion usually culminating in an inflation ?n<i sudden
collapse. The magnitude of the war determines larprelv the
extent and duration of such a movement, A large war 1s usually
so completely destructive that the tendency towards exnrnsion
cannot assert itself in too great a movement, A period of
recuperation immediately follows a war and the steel Industry
has proven this. The excesses of the war boom had to he
corrected. Prices in general rose to such hlch levels that it
was cheaper to import goods and purchase those. Gold was
flowing out of the country at an unprecedented rate. The rise
in prices increased the money in circulation, made necessary
larger reserves of gold which in turn necessitated the raisins
of the rediscount rate to keep gold in the country. Rising
prices stimulated excessive inventory buying, tossing? their
goods on the market halted production. As a result, nrloes fell
immediately and spectacularly. Once inventories were
liquidated, production was resumed and came back to nominal
again.
Problem of Capacity
The steel industry has felt the effects of a rost war
period. Increased capacity and stepped up production to meet
war needs had to decline when the demand no longer existed.
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There were few alternatives which the industry could taVe -
either to abandon the excess capacity or to turn it into other
types of production. Abandoning capacity was out of the
question for it represented huge investments. Therefore, the
second alternative was chosen. The industry turned to
stimulate domestic consumption. Foreign demands of American
Steel helped to keep the industry at fairly hiph levels in 1920.
However, as the countries abroad got back on their feet and
resumed their industries, exports of steel diminished.
At first the building and construction and railroad in-
dustries kept steel at a fairly erood level of operation. How-
ever, they declined in the twenties and left the steel industry
supplying only the smaller outlets. The one savins factor of
the steel industry in the post war period was the automobile
industry. Its tremendous expansion in the twenties helred to
bolster steel. There was, however, one technicality and that
was the need for llp-ht steel in automobile production, whereas
most of the existinp* plant capacity was geared for heavy steel
production. There was only one thinf to do and thatwas to
create lip-ht steel capacity. In the 1920 f s this is the chancre
taking nlace.
Moreover, technicians and engineers now havine- mor>e time
discovered new methods of efficient production. This
necessitated the abandoning of some caracltv and we find that nig
iron capacity declined in the period 1924-1929. ^ome furnaces
were scrapped, others were left idle and labeled out of date.

The greatest contribution engineers have made has been the
discovery of a way to use more steel scrap and less Iron ore in
production and the use of a continuous strip roll]. This has
resulted in a prolonged life for the mines &s well as a clearer
product
The heavy steel producers, United States Steel, and
Bethlehem found themselves in a difficult position during the
depression markets. Being geared to heavy steel production,
they found themselves on the outside as the automobiles, air-
planes, dirigibles, machine and heat resisting machinery found
increased uses for the special steels. Tn this period, the
largest per tion of the steel market was seeking the lipht and
special steels
.
prices
A considerable felsibility exists in steel prices. Not
only do steel prices fluctuate but, also, prices of different
steel products fluctuate in varying decree and direction. In
1924 prices of all steel products were considered as beln*?
normal. In that year there were,
Price in 1924 (1)
1. Rails $43.00 per gross 1(
2. Structural Shapes 2.19 per lb.
3. Plates 2.12 tt rt
4. Standard Pipe 70.30 ti net ton
5. Bars 2.20 N lb.
6. Wire Nails 2.89 tt keg
7. Hot Rolled Sheet 2.79 ft lb.
8. Cold " " 5.00 ft
9. Tin Plate 5.50 H hose box
(1 ) As reported by Iron Age U.S. Steel Corp. TNEC Papers Vol. IT
p. 76.

Average Yearly Base Prices of Principal Steel Products
Reported by Iron Age 1924 - 100
Structural
Source: After a chart in United States Steel Corporation
T. • E. C. Papers. Vol. II p. 77
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Prom 1924 to 1940 - for eight years - rails were $43.00 per
gross ton when they declined to a low of $36.37 in 19.^4. Since
that year they have fluctuated around $40.00 a gross ton. This
shows the little demand arising from the Railroads In this
period, structural shapes from 1924 to 193"7 zi^?ag(?ed hut
always fell. In 1957, it reached the 1924 level of |2.19 and
has onlv slightly fallen off. throughout the depression years,
the building industry h*>s been inthe doldrums and only recently,
that is since 198^, has it sho^n si?ns of any activity. The
most notable prices which rose were the steel plates and steel
bars. Both swung down low until 193* where th^y received an
irrpetus and surpassed the 1924 level. All others fell with the
most notable drop being in the hot rolled sheets and the cold
rolled sheets. This is due to the installation of the con-
tinuous strip mill which has enabled the industry to nroduce
more sheets and lower prices. The following chart, illustrates
price behavior in this period. In summary it may be said that
the prices of steel today are generally lower.

Labor
In 1924, Gary abolished the twelve hour day and many other
coirmsnles followed suit. Nevertheless, organized labor was stil
not recognized. "Up until the depression, the Corporation
raised wages eighteen times setting levels for the Industry
and taking the lead in reducing them four times. The wage
policy suggests that the Corporation is neither backward nor
progressive in relation to the national industrial scene it
(1)
has simply been negative." The labor policy of the Steel
industry has been to maintain their own labor unions «nd an
Open Shor until 193 17 when the Congress of Industrial Or<?aniza-
tions and Labor signed 514 steel manu^acurers
,
fabricators, and
processing firms to a contract. A few companies held ou^
,
namely, Bethlehem, Republic, Inland, and Vounpstown Steel and
Tube and they had strives.
The Industry is now largely unionized and most units are
members of the Congress of Industrial Workers. The attitude of
the National Labor Relations Board enabled the C.I.O to
dominate most units. It has disestablished company unions and
ordered employees to choose one or the other. It also ordered
the reinstatement of strikers and taken other action r^parded as
hicrh handed and dictatorial. With power 1n its bonds for the
first time the National Labor Relations Board went too far and
gained the ill favor of the C.T.O and the A.F. of L. Pavrolls
usually eat up* approximately 40$ of every sales dollar in the
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industry. On the whole since 1918 wages have been steadily on
the increase. (See chart - next page)
Management
Management in the last decade has been progressive in
handling the problems of rehabilitation, higher wages, taxes,
indebtedness, labor and prices. Since 1929, 3,073,000 net
tons of steel furnace capacity has been abandoned and replaced
with a canac^y of 8,658,000 net tons. Modernization of
furnaces increased total capacity by 4,^30,000 net tons. At
the end of 1939, net infot capacity for the United States Steel,
for example, was 81,619,000 net tons - 14# *bove 192.9, Prom
1935-1939 the industry spent $937,000,000., and $146,000,000.
(estimated) in 1940 to improve mills. The first continuous
tolling mill, the height of steel efficiency operation, was
established in 1926. By 1939 there were 27 in operation re-
sul 1 lnp in an improved steel output per man. In 1939, +-he
average uutput was 1 20 pounds per man compared wi^h 112 in 1937
and 105 in 1936.
Total indebtedness of the industry has shrunk as a
result of refinancing preferred issues end substituting lover
dividend preferreds. It is estimated that this debt reduction
cut interest charges from $68,000,000. to $36,000,000. annually.
Total indebtedness for United States Steel in 1925 was 1.3
billion dollars. By 1938, It was reduced to 953 millions and
by 1936 to 246 millions. The l«st decade has been exceedingly
difficult for the steel industry due to unfavorable economic

DISTRIBUTION OP T^E SALES DOTTAR
United States Steel Corp.
1929-1938
Common Dividend 1,1%
freferred Dividend 3.8^
Bond Interest l»Ot
Payrolls
42. 8#
Source. United States Steel Corporation. T.N.E.C. Papers.
Volume IT. p. 25.

developments, rlsiner taxes, increased efficiency, labor costs
which were partlv offset by reduced fixed charges, improved
products, and the lntenance of operations at any levels
(1)
regardless of how low.
An analysis of earning power, sales, and costs Indicate the
position of the different companies.
(2)
Sales in 1933 and 1934 as a % of 1930 100
1930 1933 1934
united States Steel 100 44.4 50.1
Bethlehem 100 46.4 65.0
Republic 100 55.2 67.0
Youngs town 100 44.5 5*.
9
National (estimated) 100 83.3 104.5
Inland 100 53.2 78.1
American Rolling Mill 100 78.0 101.6
In this chart, the crucial weakness of the Steel Corpora-
tion is shown. In 1934, great progress was made In reducing
costs. On 5,805,000 tons in 1934, the operating profit was
#4.65 a ton. With this big improvement over 1933, the year 1934
has a worse showing. All of which means that a large per cent
of the dollar received leaks away in costs which include plant
operations as well as management.
The United States Steel Corporation is in the heavy steel
business, while the market for this period wss for lisrht steel.
Railroads and construction builders, the he^vy steel users,
were also in the doldrums while the automobile lndusrtv, a
TD Fortune May 1936 p. 16*
(2) Ibid. p. 167-169

a light steel user, was going along very nicely. However, the
United States Steel Corporation is not? overloaded with heavy
steel capacity in comparison with its corn-net itors , but since
the Corporation is so big, it still has a sizeable amount of
capacity in heavy steel.
United States Steel 55# of its finishing capacity in heavy pro-
ducts .
Bethlehem 81%
Republic £1%
National 9%
Inland 59%
National has 66$ of its capacity in light steel and 9% In rails
and structure shapes which explains its good shoving in the
above table. The light capacity of United States Steel is
mostly in products like pipes whose market during the degression
greatly contrasted.
Operating Profits before depreciation and depletion
(1)
as a % of each year's sales
1930 1933 1934
United States Steel 12.9 3.6 6.5
Bethlehem 15.2 8.0 11.1
Republic 5.1 B.7 8.5
Youngs town 14.7 9.0 n .6
National 17.6 13.4 16.5
Inland 20.5 16.6 23.3
American Rolling Mill 6.2 14.8 17.3
l summary it. may be said that the ros it ion of the United
(1) Fortune May 1936 p. 167-169.

States Steel Corporation has not passed the crucial stage.
Losses have slicrhtly impaired the financial condition. Earnings
in 1929 outweighed the sum of losses up to 1929. In short,
there is need for a change. The Corporation cannot make money
for its stockholders nor can it pay good wages to i^s employees.
It will noi- produce steel cheaply. It earned 12# in the first
ten years of its life and 2.S# in the last. Wall Street in 1935
and 1936 had a low opinion of United States Steel. The Corpora-
tion is in desperate need for a chance, but due to Its tremend-
ous size and unwieldly bulk any forthcoming change will be slow.
Bethlehem in 1935 replaced United States Steel as a stock
market quotations of United States Steel for the first time
since Bethlehem soared to 700 during the war. Inland steel,
lightly capitalized and more flexible grew strong durine- the
depression markets and National Steel produced an amazing sales
Volume and good earnings from 1932-1935.
.earnings
The large earnings accumulated in the war years were not
invested but kept in liquid form swelling working capital and
fortifying against a possible depression. United States Steel
Corporation earned in six years a surplus, after dividends, of
$473,250,419 — adding^93.10 a share to the value behind
common. Of this surplus, $318,423,519 was used to increase
working capital, $72,290,329 to reduce current liabilities and
$34,527,395 was added to the sinking fund reserve. Additions
to the property account amounted to $148,904,616.

Bethlehem incurred heavy expenses for new construct inn hut
this was financed hy the sale of securities. Surplus profits,
after dividends, amounted to $96,2*7,649 or $160,80 a share,
|65,38B,191 was added to the working capital while #162,331 ,783
was added to the property account against this increased
capital liability. #153,429,912 of this amount was financed hy
the sale of securities.
Republ lc Steel used slightly more than half of its
$70,826,281 surplus earnings ($102.75 a share) or $15,57R,791
in plant construction and expansion. $14,941,51* was added to
the working capital and $837,158 to reduce capital liabilities.
Comparisons of working capital show that United Stages
Steel Corporation added to cash and security holdings from 1915-
1920 the huge sum of $210,905,989 inventories increased hy
practically the same figure as inventories — $103,444,385.
Bethlehem made larger expenditures than any other company a
great deal of which was the result of the war. Expenses and
acquisitions amounted to $275,000,000. Surplus availahle for
common dividends after the six year period ending December 21,
1920 amounted to $201.00 a share hut this was not all paid out
for $106.80 a share was retained after common dividends were
paid.
Steel shares had great values added after this six year
period. It was assumed that after the war the companies would
invest their surplus earnings in the non-productive plants.
This was not true in all instances. The United States Steel
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Corporation, Republic, Lockaro, and Widvale added large sums to
actual cash value a? well as spending millions for new construe*-
tion and acouisi tions as Bethlehem did. The TTn5ted States Steel
Corporation spent nearly $500,000,000 for new construction and
acouisitlons which was equal to an average of $9"7.00 a share on
common stock. The surplus after preferred dividends in this
same period was equal to an average of $144.05 a share on
common stock and after the common dividend was rpld, a balance
equal to*93.60 a share on common was retained. Rerubllc Steel
from 1914-1920 earned $126.44 a share for its common stock but
retained $102.75 a share in the company. Many millions were
spent for new construction and acquisitions largely connected
with the diversification of its products which in later years
(1)
added greatly to earning power.
Security Status
The depression years saw the industry trying to acclimate
itself to business conditions. Heavy steel production only
rose as general business rose. The production picture of the
industry may be said to be identical with that of the business
behavior in the country. After the short depression of 1924,
steel securities also rose to unprecedented heights in 1929
only to fall to the bottom In 1932-3. The following charts
showing net income and monthly price range of common stocks
shows the picture. However, two definite trends are obvious,
namely, the position of the light and alloy steels in this
(1) Figures from Barrins may 9, 1921 p.
5
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•period and mpna^ement. These companies not burdened with
heavy costs as United States, for example, were mo^e flexible.
In the crash, of 1929, they also fell but recovered more
quickly. This was partly due to their financial structure as
well as to the increasing market for specialised steels.
National Steel is the perfect example. The comrany had every-
thing for a crisis market - small emphasis on rails, tubes, and
structural needs, a heavy emrhasism on steel sheets for the
automobile market and tin plate for the humble, yet big, steel
consumer, the can. It had the only mill in Detroit tailored
to meet the needs of the automobile industry. Here it stepped
away from the precedent. Instead of havinff consumers come to
it, National Steel went to the consumer, thereby eliminating
the location factor in costs. National Steel rose from sixth
position in profits in 1929 to fourth in 1930 and stood alone
in solitary grandeur asthe only profit maVer of the lo^ from
(1)
1932-1933.
The United States Steel Corporation made a poor shoeing
during the depression. One of its main troubles is the
enourmous plant investment required and small orerrtions make
for unprofitable years. It costs the same amount of money to
run a mill at 30$ capacity as at 100%. Furthermore , sales
possibilities are limited In poor times because steel forms a
sm^ll part of the costs of the Industries that use it do that
a reduction in price would stimulate their demand only
(1) Steel Dictator p. 326.

moderately. Steel cannot prosper unless other industries are
prospering. In 1934 the plant to sales ratio for United States
Steel was 2.75 and in the first nine months of 1935 earnings
looked sick in comparison to those of other companies.
learnings Before Interest — first nine months of 1935. (1
(OO's)
National Steel 10,106
In! and 8,005
Reoubl* c 5,671
Bethlehem 7,068
Youngs town 3,363
Jones-Laufrhlln D d 299
United States Steel D d 507
For the full year of 1935 the corporation earned $5,500,000 for
which the corporation railroads contributed a net of $6, 000, 000
(estimated) and the Corporation itself was at a higher rate of
capacity than its competitors. All of which proves that the
Corporation itself lost a tremendous amount of money and even
(2)
favorable railroad earnings couli not lift it out of the red.
The record of the steelindustry in comparison with others
which have had to cope with the problem of bigness do^s not
standi out too favorably over six years of prosperity end five
years of depression (1925-1936)

Net Earnings before Interest of Various Corporations
Expressed as % of the sum of funded debt, carltal
Stock and surplus at the end of respective years. (1)
Total Total Total Average
1925-30 1931-35 11 years 11 years
United States Steftl 37.5 d. 5.9 33.1 3.0
General Motors 154.7 17.8 195.1 1^.1
Allied Chemical 66.6 38.3 105.5 9.6
and Dve
General Electric 93.2 32.4 128.1 16.6
Kennecott Copner ^0.3 5.2 74.2 6.8
Dupont 82.8 43.0 121.7 11 .6
American Can 70.4 46.2 116.4 10.6
American Radiator 82.8 1.2 79.6 7.2
International 58.5 1.5 57.6 5.2
Harvester
Inland Steel 59.3 19.8 97.2 7.0
Youngstown Sheet 48.3 d.4.3 43.8 4.0
and Tube
Bethlehem 31.3 1.6 3"7.5 3.4
American Rolling M11140.4 10.0 44.9 4.1
It must be remembered t^at General Electric has very good
patents and that the automobile boom began in 1910 and was still
going on. This table proves that it is more difficult to make
money in steel than it is in tbe automobile industry. Since
raw steel is 1-| cents a round, it is a commodity whose s«les
cannot be increased by stream-lining. Moreover, Steel in this
period 1s a mature industry. Its boom davs were in 1890-1910
period and its curve has flattened out since. Even in the days
of Coolldge prosperity the industry earned only ^.4$ on its
investment
.
The following tables present a picture of steel earnings
(2)
in the last two years, 1939 and 1940.
(1) After a table in Fortune, May 1936 p. 164
(2) Tables from Poors ^teel and Industry Basic Surveyl940 p.
8
r a
Chapter IV
Present War and Outlook.
Warfare today is not trench warfare and an army marching on
its stomach; instead it is a mechanized war of airplanes,
tractors, tanks, trucks, and motorized equipment coupled with a
quickened tempo for replacement. Since Hitler's march caught
the democracies unorepared, the industries, especially the
steel industry, are at a feverish pace. From September, 1939,
to August, 1940, operations averaged 91.3.^ of capacity and the
actual out ut was 63,100,000 net tons. Production of pig iron
and steel ingots in the last four months of 1937 was equal to
44,^ of the total output for the year. The restricted output
during the earlier months of 1939 prevent the total for the
year from exceeding that of 1937.
Year Output (net tons) % of capacity
1939 52,799,000 65
1937 56,637,000 72
1929 63,205,000 89
The German blitzkrieg on Europe's mainland is responsible
for our National Defense Program and war-geared economy. In
the next five to six years, the cost of this program is
estimated to be in the vicinity of $40, 000, 000, 000. to supply
]13 with a two ocean navy, an expanded air force, a mechanized
army, and an increase in the number of men in our armed forces.
In this war, Steel is the most important war material and the
industry is already getting a huge steady flow of orders,
1. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry Survey pp. 52-3
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although they will te but a small percentage of the total
output. The navy will require at least a billion and a half
tons of steel, road building will consume another million tons
and, in addition, there will be demands for shell, sheet steel
for tanks, guns, ammunitions, and other raw material. Chairman
Ryerson of the Board of Directors of Inland Steel estimated that
domestic demand will not exceed from "6-7 million tons in a peak
year and might be as low as 5 million tons in 1942. nl Never-
theless, this is still a lot of steel. Defense contracts
awarded since June 30, 1940 amounted to
United States Steel $50, 000, 000. 2
Bethlehem 6,500,000.
Republic 154,362.
Inland 39,580.
Output for the year 1940 reached 66,993,000 net tons with an
operating capacity averaging 82% for the year. This record
surpassed that of 1929 and established a new time high. This
output was made possible mainly by a steady expansion in
facilities during the last 30 years (except for three years
1932-35). Ingot steel and steel for castings also established
a new high with record output reaching 84,152,000 net tons at
the end of 1940. Pig iron output expanded to 46,816,000 tons.
Total ore shipped abroad rose to 74,969,000 tons. The inter-
grated steel companies which own their resources of raw materials
now nossess an advantage which was a handicap in the depression
period. It must be remembered that in the steel industry high
1. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry Survey p/ s 2-5
2. That is, since June 30 to November 10, 1940. Barron's
Nov. 10, 1940. p. 3.

levels of operation reduce unit costs as a whole and frequently
more than offset the higher prices of raw materials. However,
any bottleneck in coke or other raw materials places hardship
on the unintergrated units.
Prices
The price structure is greatly improved. With all plants
operating at capacity, there are no more economic concessions.
In 1940, steel scrap set a new high. From the low of $l6.75»
in April it rose to $23.00 and $24.25 a ton. Pig iron, on the
other hand, changed relatively little in the same period.
However, the threat of serious price rises and inflation brought
about price restriction by the Price Stabalization Division of
the Office of Production Management. In January, 1941,
Commissioner Leon Henderson placed a tentative ceiling of
$20.00 a ton for No. 1 heavy melting steel at Pittsburgh. This
is $2,00 below the levels already reached at the end of 1940.
Coke, too, by early 1941 rose $1.00 per ton. This rise in-
creased the costs of pig iron producers. However, the reduction
on scrap and the increase in pig iron tend to offset one
another, so that costs have not materially risen.
Many people are asking why is steel scrap playing so
large a part in present steel production and why the price of
pig iron has been pushed down.
The answer is the more scrap used, the less money is
invested in coal mines, ore reserves, and blast furnaces.
These expenses are borne by the intergrated user making pig
iron, which comes back to the scrap user as iron and steel
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scrap. Since location to coal and ore is not a predominate
factor to the scrap user, he can set up buildings anywhere-
next to manufacturing centers whose factories will sell him
cheap scrap. Examples of such concerns are the Continental
Steel of Kokomo, Indiana, and Keystone Steel and The Wire
Company of Peoria, Illinois.
Apparently, the percentage of pig iron and scrap consumed
will not vary in their ratio to each other more than moderately.
The real reason for the increased use of scrap is that its use
does prolong the life of ore deposits and necessitates less fuel
in manufacture. The potential supply of scrap is great and
tends to increase. Its widespread availability has made
possible many small steel companies. In fact, many steel
makers look uoon scran iron as a natural resource.
The demand for scrap fluctuates more widely than that for
pig iron. Intergrated companies, in times of curtailed opera-
tions, are forced to consume a larger proportion of the pig
iron in order to keep the blast furnaces going. When times are
better they resort to pig iron and steel scrap. Consequently,
scrap prices are more sensitive to change in steel production.
1. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry Survey, 1940 p. S2-14-15
2. Ibid. P. S2-18
15. Fortune. March, 1936. t>. 176-8
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Iron Age Composite Index of Steel Scrap Prices
Year
June, 1936
Spring, 1937
June, 1938
early Aug. ,1938
Spring, 1939
Feb., 1940
Dollars per gross ton
1 13
21
11 (slump in domestic
operations and a subsidence
of export demand.)
15
15
16
The average price of steel scrap in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and
Philadelphia in September, 1940, was §20.00 per gross ton. The
following table will further point out the extreme fluctuations
of scrap in comparison to the other steel products:
Average Monthly Prices of Pig Iron , Cast Iron Pipe,
""
Finished Steel and Steel Scrap , 1939 (2)
1939
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
April
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov
.
Dec
Labor
Pig Iron Cast Iron Pipe Finished Steel Steel Scrap
20.61 49.— 2.29 14.94
20.61 49.-- 2.29 15.01
20.61 49.— 2.29 15.20
20.61 49.— 2.29 14.77
20.61 49.— 2.26 14.17
20.61 49.— 2.24 14.71
20.61 49.— 2.24 14.92
20.61 49.-- 2.24 15.43
20.61 49.— 2.24 18.32
21.61 52.20 2.24 19.66
22.61 52.20 2.26 19.66
22.61 52.20 2.26 18.05
21.19 48.40 2.26 16.39
On January 1, 1939, the United States Department of Labor
1. Poors. Industry Studies, 1940 p. S2-18, S2-19
2. Pig Iron is | per gross lb; cast iron is } per ton @ New York
of 6" and larger pipe; Finished steel is cents per lb; and
Scrap is J per gross ton at Pittsburgh, Chicago, and
Philadelphia. Survey of Current Business, 1940. p. 9
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1
prescribed minimum hourly wage rates of $0.62g- an hour for the
bulk of the industry. The range was from $0.62-2- in the
Central and New England States to $0.45 in the South East and
South Central States. The Nation was divided into six zones.
In zones one and three, $0l62-| - having 92% of steel ingot
capacity; $.60 in zones five and six (Far West) with 2.5$ of
ingot capacity; $.58-§- in zone four (the 7 states west of
Illinois and Wisconsin) with 21% of ingot capacity and $.45 in
the South (zone two) where there is 3.4$ ingot capacity. The
Walsh-Healy Act authorized that these designated minimums must
be paid by comoanies bidding for government contracts. The
increased business made it advisable for the industry to comply
with these rates, and by August, 1941, practically the entire
industry was paying these minimums. In 1939, the steel wage
was about 30% higher than that of 1929. Widespread plant
expansion, increased operating efficiency, and high labor costs
were offset by more sales, but lower profit margins."
1"
The seriousness of the National Defense Program should
necessitate no labor disturbances. Wage earners have been
getting more than the minimum amount and even more than that
paid in 1929.
Year Price Paid per Hour.
Aug., 1940 85.1 cents
1939 84.2
1929 65.4
1. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry Survey, p. S2-5
2. Ibid. p. S2-15-17

7But there have been strikes and it does not seem that they
will be avoided unless the government takes an active hand in
the matter. This it seems reluctant to do. Arguments can be
given on both sides of the question. On the one hand labor has
suffered in the steel industry for a long period of time. It
has become restless and through organized units has learned to
strike at crucial moments. Industry today is war-minded, but
labor is not. The steel problem is twofold— to turn goods out
fast enough - and to turn them out on time. Industry has the
long ooint of view in mind, which is to supply England with
what she needs and strengthen our defense; whereas, labor has
the short point of view in mind - that of immediate satisfaction.
It is not thinking in terms of the ultimate. In our present
situation, all the evils of society cannot be rectified
immediately. They take time. Therefore, this surge to amend
the evils of the capitalistic system immediately, only produces
chaos and destruction. If production is our aim today, then
let us produce under the system which can. If social readjust-
ment is our immediate goal, then let us have social reform.
The Two as they exist today cannot be combined.
Taxes
In addition to prices and labor costs, taxes will affect
the operating costs of the steel industry. In 1940, although
most concerns did well, taxes weighed heavily. The increased
corporate tax of 20.9^ and the Excess Profits of 1k% of the
our-year base oeriod plus a steeply graduated tax ranging from
\>b%-50% on earnings In excess of the basic allowance will cut

into the steel industry earnings as the defense program and
suoolying G-reat Britain gain in momentum.
G-rowth companies will be severely hit by the new tax, since
the average earnings during the 1936-1939 base period are below
their current performances. The excess profits tax has placed
a damper on expansion since higher earnings will be substantial-
ly taxed during the present period of record activity. Steel
is expanding for the sake of national defense and seems pre-
pared to accept any future consequences. The taxes placed upon
the industry amount to a 3*1% increase on the normal income tax
return which every corporation must pay regardless of whether or
not it benefits from the armament program. An earlier emergency
measure passed in July, 1940, raised the normal tax rate to 19% f
from the orevailing 185 last year and added an additional 1,9%
as a special defense tax. The latest increase has boosted the
rate to 24$, a levy 1/3 heavier than that of last year— the
highest basic rate in history. A corporation which in 1939
earned $12.20 per common share before federal taxes paid $2.20
for such taxes and had a net income of $10. In 1940, with the
same earnings, a corporation oaid |2.95 per common share for
taxes and reoorted a net profit of about $9.25 a share even
with no excess profits taxes paid. This tax was designed to
skim off the excess earnings. The "normal" net income for
tax purooses is definedin two ways:
1. 95% of average net income for tne past four years or
2. 8% of the invested capital.
A corporation is given the privilege of choosing option. All
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above the base amount is taxed at a steeply graduated rate
which averages about h0% on the first §500,000 of additional
earnings and $0% on all above that amount. Therefore, in
computing excess profits taxes a company must determine its
net income after making allowances for the higher normal income
rates which now prevail. Then they must relate this net profit
to invested capital to see whether or not the return is more or
>
less than 8%--if more, then the Q% capital base is chosen; if
less, the four-year average base.
In some companies where capital investment is generally
heavy and earnings in recent years have been low, there is room
for a sizeable expansion of profits before the ceiling set by
the excess profits tax is reached. The United State Corporation
falls under this classification.
(1)
Book Value Estimated 1940
earnings before
excess profits
tax
United States Steel $119.17 8.0
-euiiienem Ldd^jj Lc.,\j
Republic 34.18 2.5
National 60.47 7.5
Inland 62.43 7.50
Rate on 4 year Estimated 1940
Book Value average earnings after
earnings excess profits tax
United States Steel 6.7 3.19 * $ 8.00
Bethlehem 9.8 3.87 * 11,00
Republic 7.3 1.08 * 2.50
National 12.4 5.69 6.60
Inland 12.0 6.61 7.00
*-wlll probably use Qfo return on invested capital option
1. Barrons. October, 14, 1940. p.
3
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The Second Revenue Act of 1940 shows the impact upon
corporate profits. Any new levies, and there is every Indication
that there will be new levies, will cut materially into earnings
4
However, any comparison with the past year exaggerates the
picture. The United States Steel Corporation realized increased
profits in 1940. In the first nine months, income taxes equaled
$18,828,348 against |6,6o4,000 a year ago, hut the net income
before taxes was $88,824,419 in 1940 against $18,994,756 in
1939. State and local taxes are rising as well as federal.
In the first nine months in 1940 local taxes of United States
Steel were ^62,746,000, leaving a balance of 969, 418,070 for
stockholders. There is a wide distribution in the amount of
earnings consumed by taxes. It varies from 21,3% or less than
the normal tax, to 43.6^. Steel is among those companies showing
the lowest ratio of federal income taxes to profits because the
heavy investment necessary permits substantial credits against
excess profits. In tne first nine months of 1940 federal taxes
1
on income for United States Steel were equal to 21.3;^ of profits.
2
Estimated Effect of Excess Profits Tax on Per Share Earnings
Actual 1939 After Estimated 1940 Earnings
Earnings 2k% After Excess % Reduction
After Taxes Normal Profits Tax By Excess Profits
Tax Tax
United States 1.83 9.50 * 9.50 0.0
3teel
Bethlehem 5.73 14.00 *13.89 0.8
Republic 1.46 3.00 * 3.00 0.0
National 5.71 7.50 * 6.63 11.6
Inland 6.73 9.50 * 8.14 14.3
*-based on invested capital option
1
1. Wall Street Journal, Tax Series by Arundel Cotter,
"ov. 6, 1940. p. 1 & p. 4, col. 4.
2. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry. Part II Dec. 10.1940 p.
2

Although the. tax is not onerous in most cases, the effect
is not the same in all companies. It is quite unusual for steel
in general to report earnings of better than 5.,° on their invested
capital. Therefore, the Q% tax option would seem adequate for
the present period. In 1937, an extremely good steel year, the
industry, as a whole, reported earnings equal to 6,7% on its
invested capital; whereas in 1929, the earnings amounted to 10%..
Eethlehem's earnings are already in excess of the tax base,
although United States Steel has still a way to go. However, as
steel goes into maximum production, and if the war is of long
duration, the 8^ earnings on invested capital will unquestionably
be reached and that is the time to get out of steel stocks, if
return is desired.
Earnings
Eighty per cent of the total invested caoital of a steel
company is in its plant and fixed assets. Since demand fluctu-
ates more widely than does the general industry oroduction, the
earnings record shows extreme gyrations between large losses
and profits. At a low percentage capacity the industry cannot
begin to cover its overhead expenses until it reaches a certain
point. All gross profit is usually absorbed by depreciation,
amortization, interest, and non-variable expenses. Once these
costs are covered net profits accumulate very rapidly. They are
more oronounced in thoroughly intergrated companies and further
magnified wherever capital leverage is high. We must note that
smaller companies, particularly those with outlets in consumer
goods industries, and especially those specializing in alloys,
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came through the 1930 depression in fairly good shape. Over a
period of years, earnings Here relatively small. Ex:
1919-1928 average return on invested caoital 5.1$
1928-1938 " " M " M 2.4$
Because many years of the oeriod 1928-1938 were in a subnormal
category, it is likely that the industry would average about 6$
during extended oeriods of relatively favorable activity. In
1939 the net return was During the long term period, earn-
ings may be exoected to gyrate widely according to changes in
general business conditions.
A comparison of earnings of the various comnanies in the
last few years shows some striking changes. United States Steel
increased its earnings 460.2$ from 1929 to the end of the third
quarter in 1940. For the same period Bethlehem increased
earnings 194.2$ and Reoublic Steel 224.0$. If the full year
earnings of 1940 were compared with those of 1939, the percentage
increase would even be much greater. In 1940 the per share
earnings were way above those reported in 1939. The following
statistical tables show the effect of top production on earnings,.
A table on the distribution of the Steel Industry's gross revenue
is included to show how the income is divided.
Earnings Comparisons 1939-1940
(first nine months)
United States Steel $69,418,070 $12,390,756
Bethlehem 34,160,745 11,609,456
Republic 12,633,333 3,898,650
National 10,841,128 7,289,304
Inland 9,888,484 6,372,810
1940 1939
•
460.2
194.2
224.0
48.7
55.2

13.
Earnings Comparisons 1937-1940
(full year)
1940 1939 1938 1937
U. S. Steel ^102,181,321 $41,119,934 Dj7,717,454 $94,944,350
Be thlkfaem * 48 , 677 , 524
Republic * 21,113,507
National * 15,066,340
Inland * 14,450,385
^-preliminary figure
24,638,384
10,671,343
12,581,636
10,931,016
5,250,239
7,997,825
6,661,651
4,916,203
31,819,596
9,044,147
17,801,893
12,665,318
Common Share Earnings 1939-1940 (l)
1940 1939
United States Steel $5.80 |3.44*
Bethlehem '9.72 1.88
Republic 1.86 .39
National 4.92 3.31
Inland 6.07 3.92
The Distribution of Steel Industry's
Gross Revenue
Expressed in per cents (2)
1924/33 average 1929 1937 1938 1939
Payrolls 41.0 35.5 37.0 40.5 37.0
Materials 40.0 38.5 44.0 # 45.0
Depreciation 6.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 5.5
Taxes 4.5 4.0 5.5 5.5 5.5
Interest 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.5
Dividends pd 6.5 6.5 5.0 2.5
Added to 1.0 9.0 2.5 4t 3.0
surplus
^-amount not estimated
Security Status
The comparative positions of the steel companies in the
last decade, with emphasis on the last two years, offer some
ground for possible forecast. The United States Steel
Corporation record of earnings and dividends paid so far
1. Wall Street Journal. January 3, 1941. p. 12
2. Moody's Standard Trade and Securities, p. ST-23

indicate the hazardous years she has passed. In the ten-year
period 1930-1936, six years, were deficit years and five years
saw no common stock dividends.
United States Steel Corooration
(year ending December 31)
Earned per
common share
Dividends paid
on common
Price Range of
common stock
1939 1.83 none 82-42
1938 D.3.78 none 73-38
1937 8.01 $1.00 126-48
1936 2.91 none 79-46
1935 D.2.77 none 50-27
1934 D.5.39 none 59*29
1933 D.7.09 none 67-23
1932 D. 11.08 0.50 52-21
1931 D.1.40 5.50 152*36
1930 9.21 1.00 198-134
D - deficit
Undoubtedly the Corporation will be the chief beneficiary
from a revival of industry, because of its broadly diversified
activities and intergrations . The competitors of the extensive
expansion program should improve profit margins. With 31% of
domestic ingot capacity, the Corporation still enjoys a dominate
role in the indsutry. The increase in light alloy and special
steel productions since 1935 coupled with the abandonment of
high cost plants and obsolete machinery has strengthened the
manufacturing position. As of June 30, 1940, the total long
term debt amounted to $360,281,000. Net working capital was
$422,739,000. In 1937 earnings were $94,944,000, with operations
at 71.2^ capacity; whereas, in 1938 there was a loss of
7,717,000 with operations at 36.2^ capacity. The outbreak of
14.
LI. Fortune. March, 1926 p. 191
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the war in Seotember, 1939, quickened steel activity and profits
Earnings were $41,120,000 with operations at 60.7% capacity. 1
The year 1940 was the test year since 1930. Earnings were $3.04
a share in the fourth quarter alone. They could be higher, but
the Corporation deducted $.80 a share representing pension pay-
ments for the full year in the fourth quarter. In the future
this payment is to be deducted every quarter. Without this
deduction, the rate would be $3.64 a share. The other best
quarter was the second in 1937, when earnings were $3.43 a
share. It can be said that the Corporation is at the 1937
level now and destined to approach the 1929 level with continued
activity.
Bethlehem, as of December 31, 1939, has a long term debt
of $182,277,000. The J% preferred stock with a par value of
$100 has 933,887 shares outstanding. The 5% preferred issue
was called for redemption on April 1, 1940. In addition, there
are 2,984,994 shares of no par common stock outstanding.
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935
1934
1933
1932
1930
1929
Bethlehem Steel (year ending December 31)
Earned per
common share
5.75
D.0.70
7.64
2.01
b.D.1.00
b.D.2.17
b.D.5.07
b.D.8.41
b. 5.13
b. 10.89
D deficit
b based on capitalization after merger
c January, 1938 - paid off preferred 12/24/37
Dividend Paid
on common
Jl.50
none
c.5.00
1.50
none
none
none
0.50
6.00
3.50
Price Range of
common stock
100-50
70-39
105-41
77-45
52-21
49-24
49-10
29- 7
110-47
140-78
1. Poors. Steel and Iron Industry Survey, pp. S2-47-48

Although Bethlehem has "been considered as not being in as
difficult financial straits as the United States Steel Corpora-
tion, her record is very similar to the parent company. Price
range fluctuations are more erratic here. The war will stimulate
business for Bethlehem aside from the high level of ship
building which is being enjoyed. That the company will earn
tremendous amounts is unquestioned, for the industry is inter-
grated and, moreover, owns the only steel plant on the Atlantic
seaboard and can make export shipments very easily. Bethlehem
is the second largest producer of iron and steel and has
interests similar to those of the parent Corporation, namely,
iron ore, coal, limestone, properties, railroads, and steam-
ships. The aggressive expansion program from 1935-1939 left the
company well-rounded in output production of heavy and light
steel. Annual ingot capacity as of January 1, 1940, amounted
to 10,240,000 gross tons. The long term debt of $182,277,000
is not excessive in comparison deoreciated physical assets.
In March, 1940, the 3 1/4^ and 4 bonds were re-
financed saving -?1, 213, 000 in fixed charges. Later the 5%
preferred stoc^ issue was redeemed eliminating $933,900. prior
charges. Furthermore, in July last year, the company arranged
the refinancing of the 3 1/2% debenture issue. It was called
on August 26, 1940 - an additional saving. Working capital at
the end of 1939 was $187, 340,000 - a mark exceeding that of the
previous ten years. In the last war, the company was largely
a munitions and a shipbuilding plant with light capitalization
and high earnings. The present conflict finds Bethlehem a
16.
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well-rounded steel industry with a large caoitalization and
already at a point where the Excess Profits Tax cuts into its
earnings. Earnings over the past five years were
1940 $14. 04 a share (largest in company's
history.
)
1939 5.75
1938 D. .70
1937 7.64
1929 11.01
It is estimated that the Excess Profits Tax is liable to cut in
after earnings exceed $12.50. 1
Barrons. February 3, 1941. 1.13

Chapter V
Conclusions
From our survey of fhe s^eel Industry in war economics,
we find several items stand out sharrly. In the sphere of
production we notice marked contrast. Total steel riant
capacity in 1914 was 3,300,000 net tons whereas today it is
6,600,000 net tons. Steel operations then, at the outset of
the war, were running at 59% of capacity and did not reach
90% until 1916. Today, at the besrinninf of the war period,
we are running at 90$ capacity operations. However, there is
a difference. The last war was rather slow ingettinc started.
The "blizkrieg" had not been invented and warfare was mainly
trench warfare. Everybody realizes today that England's fate
rests upon our anility to supplv her with the things she needs-
ships, airplanes, and ammunitions. These require steel.
Therefore, it can be said that the fate of England and our
stake in the prrsent conflict rests upon the fast nroductabi-
lity of our steel mills. The following table illustrates the
industrv's rated annual capacity in net tons for producing
ingots and steel castings from 1918 to date and illustrates
the tremendous capacity existing today in comparison with
that of 1918.
As of Dec. 31. Insrots Ingots and Steel
for castings*
1918 58,630,000 61,021,000
1929 70,636,000 78,985,000
1934 78,103,000 78,452,000
1937 79,593,000 80,18^,000
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1938
1939
1940
81,238,000
80,951,000
83,581,000
81,829,000
81,619,000
84,152,000
*In figures for 1934 on total capacity includes that
part of capacity operated by companies producing
steel ingots. (1)
trices
Prices of steel products in the last war soared to un-
precedented heights. Very often prices changed weekly. Steel
was experiencing a runaway market. When the United States
entered the war in 1917, the War Industries Board stabili ?ed
prices at levels which enable the high, cost producer to make
sizeable profits and the low cost producer to obtain banner
profits. Prices had three years of unhalted rises before
controls were set. The present situation sees a change. Steel
prices have ahd a tentative ceiling set at the outset of the
war accompanied with a threat of using force and risrid con4
trols if the prices were not maintained. The Government is
hoping to curb any possible price spiral inflation and ex-
cessive steel profits as occurred in the last war.
Labor
The one weapon labor holds today which it did not possess
in the last war is the power to strike. In 1914 steel wages
were low in comparison to those of today, but the cost of
living was lower at that time. The adoption of the code and
the recent minimum standards set by the government have pushed
(1) After a table in Steel Pacts, February 1941 No. 45 p.
3

wacres to a higher level than has ever been attained. Averse
weekly earnings today have a higher buying' power th^n they did
in 1929. The National Industrial Conference Board found that
wages in the fourth quarter of 1940 were 7% above the buying
power of earnings in 1929. "Hourly earnings of steel workers
in October, November, and December of last yea* averaged 86.1
cents an hour, or almost 1/3 more than the average for 1929 of
65.4 cents an hour. The average number of hours worked each
week was 38.4 in the last quarter of 1940, conr ared with an
(1)
aver>a<?e of 54.9 hours ner week in 1929."
Taxes
Taxes today are nrogressie.l andskimmin^ off anv excess
war earnings. In the last war, the industry had the benefit
of three years' operations before any excess nroflts tax came
in^o effect. Today the situation is different. Similar to
prices where controls were olaced upon the Industry- at the
bear inning of the war period, excess war profits are also in
force. They are not burdensome, but they are aceomnlishing
their rurpose of taking away war nrofits.
Earnings
Thile industry in the last war had a free r^in as to the
amoun*- of earnings it mnde, today with labor rushing from one
side for increased wacres, with taxes pushing from the other to
take away war profits, and with nrices stabillred, ^he^e is
(1) Steel Pacts, February 1941. No. 45 p.° col.
3
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little possibility for any increased earnings. Price earnings
ratios are lo™ for most of the steel securities which proves
the point that present as well as future earnim s will probably
be similar.
Future Business Conditions
It is estimated that war work, directly or indirectly, is
expected to keep steel operating at 90 <£ capacity or better for
some time ahead. Improved selling prices and heavy volume are
absorbing rising costs at present and should continue for the
immediate future, at least. Wages will probably be raised
soon, but prices will not rise in proportion. Higher taxes
are likely to prevent steel from reporting much, if any, better
earnings in 1941 than in 1940. Order books are crammed with
business. Many small companies have sold out their capacity
in many products well into t^e second quarter of 1941. In-
coming business is active, especially tin plate and pine and
is still In excess of capacity. There m*y be some slacVenlnc:
by s-nrin?, when the demand for steel to construct armaments,
plants, and c p ntonments , airports etc. will pnob«hlv h*>ve
passed its peak and when the automobile curtails its production
seasonally. However, this should be offset by an improved
demand for steel for the manufacture of tanks, shells, ^nd
other ordinance should appear in volume. Unless the w Rr ends
soon, the export demand from Great Britain and Canada csn pick-
up n>ny domestic slack. The first quarter of 1941 should see
steel at 95t capacity. Whether or not this can be maintained

depends rrimarilv on the extent the Defense Work interferes witp
normal operations and with the mr>5or consuming outlets. Some
interference is expected, because of -nossib^e material and
labor shortages - but it should no 4- reach major proportions
.
Therefore, it is conservative to say, assuming th*>t ^he
United States stays at peace throughout the yea*, that 1Q41
production of open-hearth anr? bessemer steels will average $0%
or better and then total about 75 million <-ons. The industry's
primary concern will not be obtaining volume, but producing it.
At its peak the Defense Armament demand fo>- steel will not
exceed 10% or so of the industrial capacity to m°ke ra^ steel.
If is allowed for the export demand, steel will have *70%
for domestic production. The big volume in sight ?1ves assur-
ance of hi^-h profits. Standard Statistics forecasts steel
stocks in the following manner. The United States Steel common
idicates considerable promise and tbe r>referred offers a ffood
yield. Bethlehem with a continued hi??h rate of operations
assured for some time, gives evidence of a common stock above
average and the preferred an attractive yield. In the case of
Republic steel, favorable medium-term earnings prospects gives
the common a fair attraction. The preferred is overpriced in
relation to the preference stock. National ha? a ?ound stock
and an above average promise; Inland with a larere earning
(1)
power has a stock which is one of the soundest 4n the e-roup.
Nevertheless, the future is uncertain and this calls for
(1) Standard Statistics. Ste 1 Trade and Securities, p.Stl-8

caution for operative result s may not be as favorable as sales
volume or out-out, since -profit margins will continue to be
restieted. Taxes may be increased. Certain material costs
have already gone up. Unions are fighting for higher wages.
The National Defense Advisory Commission will-not permit any
corres^ondi hg rise in steel prices. Therefore, near term earn-
ings m ny fell below the fourth quarter net resu^s of 1940.
Investment Principles for Steel t
1) Common stock earnings fluctuate sharply due to s wide varia-
tion in output and the leverage of relatively larffe senior
fixed costs as well as senior charges.
2) Dividend payments are irregular with not even the preferred
assured of a steady return.
3) Because of heavy capital investment, steel companies must
have a fairly heavy funded indebtedness and la rcre senior
claims shadow the position of equities during periods of
adverse operative results. Converselv, there is an Important
leverage for common share earnings of most companies in good
times
.
4) On the average, the return is low and profit margins narrow.
The rising long term trend in labor and material costs promises
to hold margins to moderate lends except in boom periods.
5) Steel stocks do not qualify for a conservative investment,
but are frequently profitable medium-term commitments. Example,
periods of war boom and prosperity 1914-1918.
6) Volume is essential in determining: operating results.
a
fluctuations in price frequently reflect the medium-t erm
outlook for operations
•
7) Only the timing and not the extent of the price movement
in steel shares is indicated "by changes in producing- activity.
Price fluctuations in individual issues may vary widely.
Besides considering the steel industry at the present
time, an investor has to look into other phases of industrial
activity to get a complete picture. In January, business
activity eontinued on its upward march. The presentation of
the Federal Buderet assured more defense contracts to the
amount of ^00 million dollars. This naturally means a h*crh
level of business activity and the nation's credit position
has all rrosrects of inflation - at least, until Congress acts
in the Federal Reserve Board's recommendations by which they
hope to curb it. Banks are increasing their holdings of
government bonds and it is certain that the supply of <?ood
honds on the market will be heavy and conseouently prices will
fall. There seems to he a universal agreement as to the
necessity of having at least 20% of the funds in cash.
Security prices are overshadowed by the expectation of un-
favorable * ar news.
Interest rates have had t^eir sha^e of attention in the
present rrosrram. If Congress adopts the proposal of the
Federal Reserve Board, it is certain that interest rates will
freeze in general
,
thereby placing long term corporate bonds
in a vulnerable position. Wartime inflation will he ^e^arded,

but stock prices will not be directly affected, since stocks
at the present moment are selling on an inflation basis. The
program really aims to prevent a serious post-war relapse.
Many people wonder what will happen if we are involved in a
war. Just because our men are not engaged in active combat,
they forget t>-at we are really in a wartime economy and any
formal declaration of war will not materially alter our
nresent position.
The evergrowing fear of our entry inro tbe war and the
great deal of worry and pondering about it, has resulted in
weak securities. The same situation existed in the summer of
1939, so 'that when war was declared, people were "^or^ied out".
The prevailing sentiment on Wall Street is bearish and yet, if
we are actually brought into war, the country would see a
further stimulation of business activity. With or without war,
we are still confronted with the problems of economic upheaval
and a curtailed demand when It is all over. With a high level
of business activity and large supply of credit, commodity
nrlces, demand deposits and bank debit induces rising, a bear
•position can mean only worry and fear of what is going *"o
happen.
Summary
Although volume is the prime requisite for profits, the
dividing line differs substantially between units. Tn some
units, profits depend upon the relation between the level of
the selling price and the cost of labor and fuel , or u-non the

type of material shipped for highly finished items result in a
better return, or upon the continuity of operations, or from
the return on related activities. As a result, the break even
point for s producer fluctuates materially from time to time
and the approximation of the dividing line between profit and
loss at any ffiven time is of little or no permanent value.
Since competition keeps operatine- mpr>gins down, even In good
volume years , and overhead costs exert a powerful lever on the
profit and loss showing, in poor times, the earnings record is
generally poor. Prom 192P to 1939, the average return on net
eouity was about Z%. In the best single year, 1929, eleven
percent was the average earned on equity and only six and s
seventenths percent in 193^. Even though earnings recovered
after 193?, they were sub-average, because profit margins
were narrower, competition had increased and costs were higher,
especially later. As a rule, year to year, earning fluctua-
tions are of a sizeable amount showing marked sensitivity to
volume changes. Eut with no ma lor widening of avrrage profits
forseen for the early future, it is unlikely that banner
profits will come in the near future.
In the last analysis, the business cycle is the summation
of the steel business. #11 the compaAies do not rise and fall
together. Some reach their peak early intthe recovery period,
others las, others show a meagre recovery, and some continue
to be prosperous, after the general business recession is wide
spread. New Inventions, technological improvements and
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changes in supply and demand alter the status of an industry.
Mature companies lose their vitality and new ones spring up.
Therefore, it is necessary to study industry trends. Further-
more, since even a comoaratively weak company can make money in
an industry that is flourishing, while a stronger company may
not he able to rise above the handicaps imposed upon it, by a
declining industry proves the importance of knowing the
position also.
Security Status
As to the present standing of steel securities, it has
been stressed again and again that steel is not fundamentally
a conservative investment. Earnings are too eractic due to the
fact that steel is a fesic industry and therefore in conjunction
with the business cycle. No person should make the mistake of
considering steel as secure an investment as public utilities.
Speculation is trie term applied to steel stocks. Statistical
data has proven this. If a person jumped into steel in 1914
and jumped out in 1918, his investment was very profitable.
Then, if he got in again in the early twenties and jumped out
in 1928, he increased his financial position. And it may be
similarly pointed out that if he got in during the lows of the
thirties and sold out in 1937, his investment in 1914 was
greatly magnified. This is very easy to say now as we look back
over the period. The difficulty is to recognize the trends at
the time of occurence. To do this one must be familiar with
the industry, and this is the reason why a survey of the
factors of production is given.

11.
It has been oointed out that the heavy steel industry is at
the smoothing-out period of its growth curve, the intensive
stage, when this artificial steel war prosperity is eliminated.
Light steels and alloys are coming more and more into domestic
use. They are growth companies with a future. The investor
must not fail to recognize this fact. The speculator already
has
.
From June 1940, to December of that year trading in steel
stocks on the market has been regular. Approximately the
same amount of stocks were bought and sold. A survey of
Investment House market trading in this oeriod shows that 19
transactions were sales and eight were purcnases. However,
the net change in volume was negligible. There was a liquidation
of 39,720 shares and a procurement of 30,600 (1). Of this
volume the distribution was as follows:
No. shares No. shares
Sold Bought
United States Steel 2,800 21,100
Bethlehem 1,400 11,.000
Republic 1,800 none
National 1,000 none
Inland none 500
This indicates how institutional investors rated steel stocks.
The sales of Republic and National may be interpreted as a step
toward the avoidance of growth comoany securities whose return
will be affected by higher taxes. Inland, besides being a well-
intergrated steel producer is also a company with a diversified
1. Investment Trust Survey by Jackson & Curtis. Brokers
February, 11940.

output which will prove beneficial. Bethlehem, the last war-
bride stock, will have huge earnings primarily from her ship-
building and munitions plants. Although the excess profits tax
will affect the company adversely, nevertheless her financial
position warrants adequate earnings. United States Steel is not
so vulnerable to taxes. She still has ample room for earnings
before they take effect.
In general steel company earnings are not expected to show
any large gain over the 1940 level. On this basis there does
not seem to be any justification for a higher price earnings
ratio in evaluating stock issues. If this assumption is
correct, then stocks are not likely to exceed tne highs
established in 1940. There are "bulls" and "bears" on the
market. The "bulls" stresshigh earnings, little vulnerability
to excess profits taxes, increased demand and the low price
earnings ratios. On the other side the "bears" question the
continuance of favorable conditions which will guarantee stock
rises and the effects a possible peace will have.
Steel ingot production in 1940 surpassed the previously
high level of 1929 by 7%* With steel export excluded domestic
demand call forth a production that was 6% below the 1929 level.
Moreover, domestic production averaged only k% over the 1937
level. In other words were it not for the huge foreign demand
steel ingot production for 1940 would average only 68.5$ as
compared with the actual figure of 82.$. These figures indicate
the extreme importance of the foreign demand for steel.
G-reat Britain's proposed imports promise to be at an

exceptionally high level. Actually steel exports have declined
in the oast months and any radical increase is not expected.
The government is looking forward to a 10% increase in
business in 1941. This seems to be a very big increase. On •
this basis domestic demand for steel will increase about 12%
(Federal Reserve Board figure). If this is true then the
demands for steel will support an operating capacity of 90%.
In all probability it will go higher. Therefore estimated
earnings for 1941 after full allowance for taxes now in force
will be
1941 possible 1940 actual
earnings per sh. earnings per sh.
United States Steel $11.45 $ 9.40
Bethlehem 13.25 13.45
Republic 3.50 3.10
a. Made on the assumption that triere will be no
drastic increase in excess profits taxes and
no sharp increases in labor andmaterial
costs. --all questionable factors.
At current prices the common stocks of these three companies
are selling at about 6.0, 6.6, and 6.3 times earnings estimated
for 1941. Capacity operations will undoubtedly be in effect
most of the year, so that there will be periods when the annual
rate of earnings will even be higher than the estimated. On the
other hand at the oresent time the main question is how much
money can steel make with capacity operations and at what rate
should peak profits be capitalized?
The fourth quarter of 1940 with capacity operations is an
example of the earnings/possible . If earnings reach the excess
profits tax level they will be approximately $12.50 per share
for United States Steel
r
$15.55 for Bethlehem, and $4.10 for
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Republic. With this knowledge the question is on what price
earnings basis are we justified in expecting the stocks to sell
at their highs. In the last war United States Steel sold at
3.5 times earnings and Bethlehem at 2.4 times. Price earnings
ratios in 1929, 1937, 1939, and 1940 were
1940 1939 1937 1929 (l)
United States Steel 6.1 8.0 9.3 9.8
Bethlehem 6.9 6.7 10.3 6.6
Republic 6.0 6.6 11.3 a.
average 6.3 7.1 10.3 8.2
a. present company not yet formed.
It is evident that steel earnings are not generously capitalized
in boom periods and that the war abroad has influenced the
present low valuation. Therefore, by apolying the average of
the 1939 and the 1940 ratio figures to the peak rate of earnings
expected in 1941, theoretically the highs for 1941 will be
1941 high 1940 high
United States Steel $87.00 $76.00 -7 x peak earnings for 1941
Bethlehem 92.00 93.50 -6.8 x "
Republic 24.50 24.50 -6.3 x "
It seems quite apparent that 1941 will not see these steel
stocks exceeding the high ooints already established. Applying
the smallest fluctuations since the last war period, between the
high and low prices to the above highs, it can be estimated the
United States Steel could sell as low as $50.00; Bethlehem,
$67.00; and Republic, $15.00 in 1941. Using past performances as
a guide it can be stated that steel kocks will probably decline
in 1941 for they h&ve always moved in a wide range. Then too
there are many factors which could depress them as for example,
higher taxes, higher labor and material costs, the termination
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of the war and even our entrance into the war. One need not be
a clairvoyant to say that some of these possibilities will becom
certainties.
e
Note: In each case earnings for the peak quarter of the year
have been projected on an annual basis and the price earnings
ratio has been based upon the highest orice reached by the three
leading steel companies at that time.

Abstract
In the foregoing chapters we have seen the position of
the steel industry in the last war, its behavior in ^he Inter-
vening period and its situation so far in the present conflict.
It is difficult to present an analysis of steel securities
without going into the factors of production. Without a
knowledge of the bearing of these items unon the Industry no
reliable analysis can be made. An investor must at least be
familiar wi^h and know the operations of an 1ndusfcry--not
necessarily in detail but at least to have a general Picture
in order to comprehend the effect of fluctuating business
conditions. This is the main reason why production, capacity,
prices, taxes, labor, and earnings were discussed. In the
last World War and the present, business conditions are
simllor. The year 191? was a prosperity year followed by the
depression - a severe steel depression in 1914. Then war
prosperity took the lead. Similarly, 1937 was a prosperity
year followed by the depression year of 1938. In 1939, the
present conflict began with an artificial war prosperity here.
Just how Ions- It will last no one can definite!^ say, but we
know that this artificial nropperity will thrive unMl we have
two naval fleets and a hus-e mecbani7ed army.
The long term trend of steel production is svnonomous
with the industrial growth of the nation and coincident with
the business cycles. Since steel is the raw material of other
4,- rr-«.
industries, general business conditions are effective to the
industry's ups and (Iotos, This is the foundation for the be-
lief in industrial circles that if a barometer of business is
wanting, watch steel production.
The United States Steel Corporation, formed in 1901,
dominates the steel Industry in America and ranks first as a
steel producer in the world, Bethlehem is a close running
second. Both are heavy steel producers, but Bethlehem has also
munition and ship-building plants which explain why she had a
running start in business in the last war in comparison with
the bigger United States Steel.
Steel production proved to be adequate for the needs of
the last war proves that steel masters know how and can produce
volume. This is still true. With prices set at a level which
insured profits, counled with a free rein to produce, the
steel industry made tremendous profits in the last war and,
consequently, ?ave its investors handsome returns. Tt was very
profitable to hold steel stocks in the last war.
Iron and Steel inerot capacity has seen a shift in emphasis
In the early daus of steel mr>k'ng, vip iron was used. As time
went on engineers found a way to use scrap Iron and thus pre-
serve inon ore deposits. Where once the normal furnace charge
was 100$ pig iron, it is now 50^, with steel scran, constituting
the remaining 50%, The cheap price of scran has been the In-
centive to an increased use for scrap and, consequently, the
less money is absorbed in fixed charges. However, the percent-

age of both consumed varies moderately 1n ^helr ratio v o each
other.
Price fixing or "price stabilization has been the rol 1 cy
of the steel industry through the ages based on the belief that
stable prices insure well rounded production and eliminates
cut-throat competition. Instituted and strictly maintained
by Judge Gary of the United States Steel C6rporation, no
company has sought to alter the system. T,"hen the government
criticised the price structure as monopolistic, the basing
system was elaborated to the Multiple Base System, but the
inherent principle was never changed. However, prices ore not
as rigid as they appear to be on paper. Numerous rrice con-
cessions are made from which the b^se rrice is ^he goal.
Earnings in the last world war soared *nd investors took
part in their enjoyment for three y<=-ars of war prosperity with-
out government controls. Furthermore, the controls, fixed
prices and excess profits taxes did not take effect until 1918
and at that did not curtail disbursements to stockholders
severely. By keeping large earnings In liauid form, spelling
working capital, refinancing, and remodeling the plants, steel
shares received greatly added values after the war. The de-
rresion of 1929 did not overlook the steel industry. It struck
severely, mainly because of the enormous plant investment
required and the small amount of operations.
The strength of war taxes today outshines those of twenty
years ago. The levy made in 1917 did not affect the industry

as much as the present tax program will. In this war, growth
companies will be hard put/ Bethlehem Steel has already earned
its tax tease, while United States Steel still has a little way
to go. The present program, taxing before dividend disemburs-
ments, reduces steel securities to ones of medium attraction.
In the 1930 decade, the main problems facin^ the Industry
were ones of plant rehabilitation, indebtedness, refinancing,
labor, and wages. Progressive management has cored with th^se
problems successfully. Rehabilitation of slants has revolved
about the establishment of the continuous rolling mill which
has resulted 1n a greater use of capital investment, greater
efficiency, and improved output per man. Indebtedness has been
solved by refinancing and saving millions in interest payments
annually. The steel industry has fought to maintain an open
shop and a twelve hour day. ^ont overs ies with the C.I.O., anfl
N.I..R.B. has not changed the shop policy, but has reduced the
work day. Steel wages were finally set at 62-|^ per hour.
Today the rate has advanced to 82^ and further increases are
threatening. Since labor is resuming its strides, the industry
Is in a crucial position. Any strike interferes with product-
ion, but any strive of prolonged duration ^ill interfere not
only with the rate of operations, but with the tide of events
abroad. England is dependent upon our steel industry and we
have promised all our aid. Labor is becoming more powerful and
demanding. Moreover, Washington is not taking any active or
preliminary steps to curb labor. As the labor costs go up,

the net eariaings will come down and similarly the net return
on investment.
The rise of light steels and alloys is the steady develop-
ment of a new trend in the industry. With the continuous
rolling mill as its means of supply and increased uses from
various channels constituting its demand, lierht steels and
alloys are going ahead. They are pioneer industries , now, and
have the happy prospects of the expansion stage before they
become staid, settled industries of the intensive stage. With
a demand for substitutions and increased uses for ^n old
product light steels and alloys are far from there hey-day.
Plastics, as yet, are no threat to the steel industry. Much
research and improvement ia necessary before thev will become
a competitor.
The mechanized warfare today is placing the steel Industry
in all-time hio-h levels. The pattern of events experienced
in the last war are not beine" followed, but rather, corrected
at the beginning. There will be no runaway or ice marVets or
tremendous earnings. Steel securities have risen wi^h the
inception of war, but will in no way approach the heights of
the last. On the other hand, returns on investment promise
to be moderate. The marVret investor can nev^r be sure ofi a
return every year. The dividend records prove this. But the
mar>pt srecul ator who looks for appreciation rather then
disbursement, provided he saw the trend at the proper time,
could maVe tremendous gains and realize profits. Steel

securities never qualify as sound investments which yielded a
return annually. There are more years of unpaid dividends
than there are paid. This is mainly due to the cyclical mature
of the industry and its "prince and pauper" characteristics.

Appendix
The copper industry is adequate to supply all nee^s and
mines in Latin America financed by American capital can take
care of any additional needs. There is more than a sufficient
supply of oil and special steps hace been takenoto insure high
grade and adeauate gas. There are enough electrical no™-er
facilities to keen, industry geared. As to the strategic
material necessary to steel production, the domestic nroduet^
ion of chromium, magenese, nickel, and tin Is insufficient
for present needs. The output of vanadium and tungsten 1s
insufficient and no colbalt is produced in the United States.
Although the government has authorized purchases of
100,000,000,000. of various essential war materials, such
supplies are to be stored, by the firmy and Navy and are not to
be released unless the President proclaims the existence of
a state of war emergency. This may heir the steel industry,
but It is unlikely thev xvill be able to get these stores to
meet the increaseing export demand.
9fe are able to procure nickel for Canada i nd vanadium
from Peru with no interruptions. Masr^nese used to come from
the U.S.S.R. but Cuba has now become an important releaser.
There is some domestic production which should increase
with rising prides for the product. Magenese production In
the United States is still costly and the ores are of low
grade. To encourage magenese production, the government
awarded a large contract to the Butte Copper and Zinc Co.,

calling for 240,000 tons to be suprlied in threeyears. Tt la
estimated that at nresent, there exists a year's sunr-ly in the
United States.
Japan used to be our chief source of tin and at rresent,
the Defense Advisory Commission has stated that we hove
enough tin on h^nd for a period of 69 months. The government
has contracted to buy 75,000 lonp tons from the International
Tin Cartel at 50^ per nound. From June 30, 1940 to June SO,
1941. In addition, the government is constructing a tin
smelter in the United States with the intention of usiner
Bolivian ores.
There is also estimated to be on hand a supply of tungsten
filling our needs for 6 months. Molyddenum could be substitu-
ted in the many alloys that require tunpsten. We have enough
chromium for a Deriod of one to three years; colbalt, however,
we have none. Our chief sunnlies are Canada and Chile and
they, in all probability, could continue to fill our demands.
w In considering the insufficient sunnly of some
minerals and the overabundance of others, remem-
ber that many new alloys developed in recent years,
such as f ledlay», f corronizing nrocess f , and in-
creased and wider uses of beryllium. Improved
domestic methods of allovinn- metals and the
greatly increased number of alloys av^ilpble inG
dicate that considerable substitutions could be
made for various minerals, if the source of
supply of any one of them is entirely cut off.
Moreover, this very factor will militate against
excessive price increases of such metals as was
witnessed during the World War." (1)
(1) All facts about strategic materials and the quotation are
from poor's Steel and Iron Industry Survey, p. S2-83 -24
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In addition, there are seven billions of excess bank
reserves and many billions of savings banks, insurance cosananls
and other insM tut ional investors - all of which may be used
to finance expansion, if there is need of it. This eBnl^ins
why the United States with its great industrial capacity can
do the lob that lies before it. All that is necessary is time
s

% of Products in Various Companies (l)
(after a table in Fortune)
U. S. Bes
.
Ren
«
J . & L. YounR
.
Nat
Bars 25 30 51 36 28 14
Plates 15 15 10 14
Shapes 11 28 17
Rods 11 5 3 10 4
Rails 12 13 3 10
Pipe 11 4 16 21 41
Sheets & Strip 10 3 25 10 62
Tin Plate 5 2 5 3 3 14
World Steel Production (2)
World Prod. U. S. Prod. U. S.
1939 147306 52799 35.8
1938 116482 31702 27.3
1937 145679 56637 38.9
1936 133080 53500 40.2
1935 106698 38184 36.1
1919 63488 38832 61.2
1918 85376 49798 58.3
1917 92660 50468 54.5
1916 90221 47907 53.1
1915 72270 36009 49.8
% of Total
LI. Steel Dictator, p. 320.
2. Poor's Standard Trade and Securities 3. T. p. 10
St. Se. S.T. p. 10

Steel Ingot Capacity by Companies (1)
(unit 1000'
s
of net tons @ end of 39
Total %
United States Steel 27,795 34.0
Bethlehem Steel 14,469 14.0
Republic 7,840 9.6
Jones & Laughlin 3,944 4.8
National 3,808 4.7
Youngs town Sheet & Tube 3,944 4.3
Inland 3,091 3.8
American Rolling Mill 3,030 3.7
Wheeling Steel 1,960 2.4
Colorado Fue}. & Iron 1,109 1.4
Pittsburgh Steel 1,070 1.3
Otis ^teel 977 1.2
Crucible Steel 933 1.1
Lukens 914 .0
Alleght-ny-Lualum 620 .7
Sharon Steel 560 .7
Grand City Steel 403 .5
Continental Steel 364 .4
Keystone Steel 265 .3
All other 8,398 10.2
81,829 100.0^
Weekly Activity in Steel
Industry
{% of Steel ingot production go total and
capacity scheduled production rates for
weeks beginning Monday.) (2)
J F M A M J
1937 79.4 79.6 85.8 89.9 91.0 76.2
1938 25.6 30.7 29.9 32.6 30.7 26.2
1939 50.7 53.4 55.1 54.7 47.8 54.2
1940 85.7 71.7 64.6 61.7 65.8 80.3
1941 -95.1 96.9
J A S N D
1937 67.3 85.5 71.6 66.1 48.6 27.5
1938 22.4 39.8 39.9 47.9 61.0 59.9
1939 38.5 60.1 58.6 87.5 92.5 92.8
1940 74.2 90.5 82.5 94.2 96.0 96.9
LI. Poor's. Standard Trade and Securities p. ST. 15.
2. American Iron and Steel Institute. Steel and Iron p. 8.
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